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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE; STATE OF UTAH,

:

PlaintiffTPetitioner,
v.
ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK,
Defendant/Respondent.

Case No. 20010809-SC
:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 2001) grants jurisdiction.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the judge erred in
sentencing Wanosik in absentia where the trial judge presumed that Wanosik's absence
was knowing and voluntary when Wanosik did not appear at sentencing?
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of
Appeals for correctness. State v. Lavman. 1999 UT 79, ^|3, 985 P.2d 911 (further
citations omitted). This issue presents a legal question which was reviewed below for
correctness. State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241,1J8, 31 P.3d 615.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Respondent's sentence
must be vacated based on a violation of Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process where
the sentencing judge imposed the statutory maximum sentence without affording counsel
the opportunity to make a statement regarding information relevant to sentencing and
without basing the sentence on reliable and relevant information?

Standard of Review: This Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for
correctness. Layman, 1999 UT79, f3 (further citations omitted). This issue was
reviewed below for correctness. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, ^[9.
OPINION BELOW
State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, 31 P.3d 615, is in Addendum A.
TEXT OF PERTINENT RULE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following rule and constitutional provisions is in addendum B:
Utah R. Crim. P. 22;
Article I, sections 7 and 12, Utah Constitution;
Due Process Clause, Amend. XIV, United States Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/Respondent Anthony Wanosik ("Respondent" or "Wanosik") pled
guilty before Third District Court Judge Judith S. Atherton to class A and B
misdemeanors for attempted and actual possession of a controlled substance. R. 18-24,
27-28, 53. Judge Atherton set sentencing for May 26, 2001 before Third District Judge
J. Dennis Frederick and directed Wanosik to go to Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P")
for preparation of a presentence report ("PSR"). R. 28. When Wanosik did not appear at
sentencing, Judge Frederick sentenced him in absentia to the statutory maximum on each
count. R. 54:3.1

1

The judge in this case was the only Third District Court judge who routinely
sentenced defendants in absentia when they did not appear at sentencing. This
sentencing judge sentenced a number of criminal defendants to the statutory maximum
2

The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence and remanded the case for
resentencing because Judge Frederick imposed sentence without affording defense
counsel the opportunity to address information relevant to sentencing and without relying
on relevant and reliable information, in violation of Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due
process. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241,ffi[28-36.The C o u r t of Appeals also held that the
judge erred in sentencing Wanosik in absentia because the judge had improperly
analyzed whether the absence was voluntary; the error in sentencing Wanosik in absentia
was harmless, according to the Court of Appeals, because while being held in jail on the
sentence in this case, Wanosik sent a letter to the judge stating that he did not have a
legitimate excuse for not appearing at sentencing. Id.,fflf19-26.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Wanosik was apprehended after a police officer saw him rummage through
donated items which had been left at a Deseret Industries store and place something in
his pocket. R. 6. During a subsequent search, officers found the items which led to the
charges in this case. R. 6-7. After pleading guilty to a class A and a class B

under almost identical circumstances where the judge simply imposed the maximum
sentence without affording counsel the opportunity to speak and without otherwise
basing the sentence on reliable and relevant information. A number of those cases were
before the Court of Appeals when the decision in this case was issued. See e.g. State v.
Gardner. 2001 UT App 335; State v. Samora. 2001 UT App 266; State v. Rogers. Case
No. 20000812-CA; State v. Vicente. 2002 UT App 43; State v. Bird. 2001 UT App 333;
State v. Wheeler. 2001 UT App 276; State v. Pavne. 2001 UT App 242. Wanosik was
the lead case and is the only case in which the Court of Appeals issued a published
opinion.
3

misdemeanor, Wanosik went to AP&P for preparation of a presentence report. R. 52.
AP&P recommended that Wanosik serve twenty days in jail with credit for time served,
followed by substance abuse treatment. R. 52:11.
On May 26, 2000, Wanosik did not appear at sentencing. R. 29-30, 54; see
transcript in Addendum C. Defense counsel told the judge that Wanosik had appeared
for his PSR and received a favorable report, and that she expected him to be at the
sentencing hearing. R. 54:1. Defense counsel also told the judge that she thought
Wanosik might have written the wrong date down, and asked for the opportunity to find
him. R. 54:1. Without affording either party the opportunity to address factors relevant
to sentencing and without referring to the PSR or following its recommendations, the
judge concluded that Wanosik was voluntarily absent and sentenced Wanosik in absentia
to a concurrent maximum sentence for each misdemeanor.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL2 ]: Your Honor, my last matter before you is Anthony
James Wanosik, and I've looked for him but I've not been able to find him, your
Honor. He did obtain his pre-sentence report.
THE COURT: Is Anthony James Wanosik in the courtroom?
(No response)
THE COURT: Yes, let's discuss that matter for a moment. This is case No.
CR00-5943. Ms. Garland, you're appearing in his behalf?

2

The transcript shows that the trial court made this statement. Read in context,
however, it appears that defense counsel was actually speaking. R. 54:2.
4

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I am, your Honor. I think given that he did go and obtain
his pre-sentence report he was intending to show up today, and so I would ask that
you hold on to any warrants and give me a chance to find him. I believe he may
have simply written down the wrong date.
THE COURT: Well
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I believe that, Judge, because this is a fairly favorable
pre-sentence report, so he would have had no reason to try and avoid court today,
it would - THE COURT: Presumably.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, it would have been in his best interest to appear.
THE COURT: I think in the meantime, counsel, given his failure to appear I will
terminate his pre-trial release, issue a warrant for his arrest returnable forthwith no
bail. My inclination is to sentence him today, and I recognize you would prefer
that I did not, but I am inclined to do so. It is curious that he has failed to appear
today, although I can only assume because he has not been in touch with you nor
has he been in touch with my court that he has chosen to voluntarily absent
himself from these proceedings.
Consequently, it is the judgment and sentence of this Court that he serve
the term provided by law in the adult detention center of one year for the class A
misdemeanor crime of attempted possession of a controlled sentence, and six
months for the possession of a controlled substance, a misdemeanor charge to
which he pled guilty. I will order that those terms be served concurrently and not
consecutively, and that they be imposed forthwith.
Ms. Garland, in the event he is in touch with you or shows up before he's
arrested, then you may approach me, but in the meantime, Mr. D'alesandro, you
prepare the findings of fact conclusions of law and order determining voluntary
absent compliance, and that will be the order.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I would object to that order because I don't think
that it takes into account his due process rights or his rights about - THE COURT: Right.

5

DEFENSE COUNSEL: However, I realize that's your order.
THE COURT: Your objection is noted. I'll grant him credit for the eight days he
served originally awaiting imposition or a resolution.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: All right.
THE COURT: All right, thank you, Ms. Garland.
R. 542-4.
Wanosik was booked on this case on October 4,2000. R. 56. On October 10,
2000, Wanosik sent a letter to Judge Frederick, asking for release and indicating that he
did not have a "legitimate excuse" for missing court. R. 66.3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court erred in sentencing
Wanosik in absentia. As the Court of Appeals concluded, the trial court erred in
assuming that Wanosik's absence from sentencing was voluntary when Wanosik did not
appear at sentencing. Additionally, Wanosik's absence was not a knowing waiver of his
right to presence where the record does not demonstrate that he knew the sentencing
would proceed without him if he did not appear. Moreover, this Court should adopt a
balancing test which requires trial courts to balance the public's interest in proceeding in
absentia against the defendant's interest in being present before permitting trial courts to
proceed in absentia. Such a balancing of interests would protect the integrity of the

3

Wanosik was released from the jail in June 2001. He served the entire sentence
in this case, with credit for good time.
6

system, the dignity of individual defendants, and the right to presence by ensuring that
sentencing in absentia occurs only in those cases where the public interest in proceeding
requires that the sentencing be held without the defendant.
The Court of Appeals also correctly concluded that the sentence in this case must
be vacated because it was imposed in violation of Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due
process. The plain language of rule 22(a) requires a sentencing judge to afford the
parties an opportunity to speak at sentencing. Because the defendant has the right to
counsel at sentencing and because the rule read as a whole contemplates input from both
parties, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that rule 22(a) requires the trial judge
to afford defense counsel the opportunity to speak at sentencing.
The Court of Appeals correctly reviewed this issue under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e).
This Court should refuse to review the state's claim that a rule 22(e) review was not the
correct procedure because this issue was not raised in the state's petition for writ of
certiorari and is not fairly included in the issues which were raised. Even if the issue is
reviewed, it should be rejected because the state's claim is incorrect. An illegal sentence
or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner can be reviewed for the first time on appeal.
The only circumstances under which this Court has rejected rule 22(e) review is when the
defendant is attacking the conviction rather than the sentence. In this case where
Wanosik was attacking his illegal sentence which was imposed in an illegal manner, the
issue could be reviewed on appeal pursuant to rule 22(e).

7

The Court of Appeals also correctly concluded that the trial court violated due
process in failing to base the sentence on relevant and reliable information. The judge
failed to conduct a full and fair sentencing or to consider pertinent factors. The record
reveals that the only factor considered by the court in imposing the maximum sentence
was Wanosik's absence whereas numerous factors supported probation. Because the
sentence was not based on relevant and reliable information, it was properly vacated.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN SENTENCING RESPONDENT IN ABSENTIA.
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to presence at all critical proceedings. Sentencing is a critical stage of the
proceedings at which a defendant has the right to be present unless he knowingly and
voluntarily waives that right. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109-11 (Utah
1996); State v. Houtz. 714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).
The Court of Appeals correctly held in this case that the state had not sustained its
burden of establishing that Wanosik's absence from sentencing was voluntary. Wanosik,
2001 UT App 241, TP9-25. In reaching that decision, the lower court relied on the right
to presence, case law from Utah appellate courts, and the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^|19-25. The trial court also erred in sentencing
Wanosik in absentia because Wanosik did not knowingly waive his right to presence.
Additionally, because the public interest in proceeding with the sentencing in absentia
8

did not outweigh Wanosik's interest in being present, the trial court erred in sentencing
Wanosik in absentia.
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRESUMING THAT WANOSIK'S ABSENCE
WAS VOLUNTARY.
1. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Based on Precedent.
As is the case with waiver of any constitutional right, a voluntary waiver of the
right to presence cannot be presumed. Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678. The burden is on the
state to establish voluntariness. State v. Wagstaff. 772 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989).
Relying on Houtz and Anderson, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded in this
case that "'voluntariness may not be presumed by the trial court.'" Wanosik. 2001 UT
App 241, lf21 (quoting Houtz. 714 P.2d at 678). In fact, "the constitutional right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel is a sacred right of one accused of crime
which may not be infringed orfritteredaway." State v. Aikers. 51 P.2d 1052, 1055
(Utah 1935). Given the fundamental and "sacred" nature of this right, the presumption
against waiver is strong. State v. Okumura. 570 P.2d 848, 852 (Haw. 1977) (cited
favorably in Houtz. 714 P.2d at 678). This strong presumption against waiver is
consistent not only with Houtz. but also with the cases cited in Houtz. and the United
States Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Houtz demonstrates that the voluntariness of Wanosik's absence could not be
presumed when he did not appear. In Houtz. when the defendant did not appear at trial,

9

the judge continued the case until the next day. When the defendant again did not
appear, the prosecutor told the court that Houtz had been arrested for drunk driving two
days earlier in California. Rather than continuing the trial, the trial court "determined
that defendant had voluntarily chosen to absent himself from the trial because he had left
Utah in violation of his bail." Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678. This Court rejected that
conclusion, reversed the conviction, and remanded for a new trial because the trial court
"made inadequate inquiry into defendant's ability to appear [at trial]." IdL.
Like Wanosik, Houtz did not appear and apparently was not in contact with his
lawyer. Moreover, Houtz had left the state in violation of his bail whereas there is
nothing in the record suggesting Wanosik had left the state. Just as the judge did not
make "adequate inquiry into [Houtz's] ability to appear" (id.), the judge in this case did
not make adequate inquiry into Wanosik's ability to appear. Without more, Wanosik's
nonappearance was not sufficient to establish a voluntary waiver of his right to presence.
The decision in Wanosik that the trial judge cannot presume voluntariness but
instead must make "an inquiry into defendant's ability to appear" (Wanosik. 2001 UT
App 241, ^|21(citing Houtz. 714 P.2d at 678)) is also consistent with this Court's decision
in Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107. This Court concluded, however, that Anderson had
voluntarily waived his right to presence at sentencing where (1) he agreed in writing and
orally that he would be tried in absentia if he failed to appear at trial; and (2) after not
appearing at trial and being convicted in absentia pursuant to his waiver, Anderson did

10

not appear at sentencing. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110-12.
Relying on cases from other jurisdictions, this Court reasoned in Anderson that
since Anderson had not challenged the propriety of the trial in absentia and the trial in
absentia was properly conducted pursuant to Anderson's knowing and voluntary waiver
of his right to presence, it necessarily followed that the trial court could sentence
Anderson in absentia and that it would be anomalous to preclude sentencing in absentia
under such circumstances. Id. at 1110 (citing Brewery. Raines. 670 F.2d 117, 119 (9th
Cir. 1982)) ("To hold that the Constitution permits a person to be tried and convicted
while voluntarily absent, and yet, somehow, precludes the sentencing in absentia of the
same person would be, at the least, anomalous.11). The decision in Anderson did not
undercut Houtz or the requirement that voluntariness cannot be presumed and must
instead be established by the state. Instead, Anderson held that in cases where a
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to presence at trial, the court can
thereafter sentence in absentia such a defendant who does not appear at sentencing.
The state is incorrect when it argues that this Court held in Anderson that "once
the State had met its burden to show that Anderson had notice, the burden shifted to
Anderson to present some reason for his absence." State's brief at 9. The Court in
Anderson did not discuss burden shifting. Instead, it focused on the fact that Anderson
had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to presence at trial and held that
sentencing in absentia was also appropriate when the defendant, who had not maintained

11

contact with his attorney, failed to appear at sentencing. Anderson. 929 P.2d at 11101111. Contrary to the state's argument, Anderson does not address the issue raised in
this case as to whether a defendant who has appeared throughout the proceedings, but
fails to appear at sentencing, can be sentenced in absentia based on his nonappearance.
In Anderson, this Court cited Wagstaff. 772 P.2d 987 for the proposition that
M

[a]ny waiver of the right to be present 'must be voluntary and involve an intentional

relinquishment of a known right.'" Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110 (quoting Wagstaff, 772
P.2d at 990). Wagstaff also mandates that "[t]he state carries the burden of showing
voluntariness." Id (citing State v. Ross. 655 P.2d 641, 642 (Utah 1982 (per curiam)).
Additionally, Wagstaff reiterates that the totality of the circumstances are considered in
determining whether a defendant waived his right to presence. Wagstaff. 772 P.2d at
990.
Beyond these general propositions, Wagstaff provides little guidance for the issue
before this Court because that case was in a different procedural posture and involved a
distinct factual situation. After being tried in absentia, Wagstaff filed a motion to arrest
judgment with accompanying affidavits outlining his reasons for missing the trial. The
lower court concluded that Wagstaff s absence was voluntary under the circumstances
outlined by Wagstaff and refused to vacate its previous order that Wagstaff waived his
right to presence. Id, Because the trial court reaffirmed its conclusion that the absence
was voluntary based on the totality of circumstances outlined in the affidavits filed as
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part of the motion to arrest judgment, Wagstaff is not instructive as to whether
nonappearance at sentencing is sufficient to establish a voluntary waiver.
State v. Mvers. 508 P.2d 41 (Utah 1973) is consistent with Wanosik. With little
analysis, this Court concluded that Myers waived his right to presence when he failed to
return for the second day of trial. Myers, 508 P.2d at 42-43. Crosby v. United States.
506 U.S. 255, 258-61 (1993) recognizes that a person who fails to appear after a trial has
commenced knows that the trial will proceed without him, and knowingly and
voluntarily waives his right to presence. Whereas a defendant who does not appear on
the first day of trial would not know that the trial would go on without him, a mid-trial
flight demonstrates a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence. Under the
totality of circumstances in Myers, where the trial was underway when the defendant
failed to return for the second day of trial, Myers waived his right to presence.
Despite the repeated mandate that the right to presence is a sacred one, that there
is a presumption against waiver of that right, and that the state has the burden of
establishing that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived that right in order to
proceed in absentia, the state argues that any determination as to whether the defendant
waived his right to presence must be made under some sort of burden shifting analysis.
State's brief at 7-11. Utah case law does not support the state's burden shifting
argument. Instead, Utah case law repeatedly clarifies that there is a strong presumption
against waiver of this important right and that the state must establish the knowing and
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voluntary character of any waiver of the right to presence.
The twenty-year-old cases cited by the state in support of its burden shifting
analysis are not compelling. See Petitioner's brief at 9, citing United States v. Marotta.
518 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Cotton. 621 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Mo. App. 1981);
Moore v. State . 670 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). All three cases involve
circumstances where the defendant fled mid-trial. As Crosby and Taylor v. United
States. 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) recognize, it is reasonable to conclude when a defendant
flees mid-trial that the defendant knew the trial would go on without him and chose not
to attend. All three courts conducted a totality of the circumstances review. See e.g.
Cotton. 621 S.W.2d at 298; Moore. 670 S.W.2d at 261. Counsel's failure to locate
Moore after contacting hospitals was a significant additional circumstance supporting the
court's conclusion that Moore knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to presence.
Id. Efforts by law enforcement to locate Cotton after he failed to appear mid-trial were
likewise significant in supporting the waiver in that case. Cotton. 621 S.W.2d at 298.
While Cotton. 621 S.W.2d at 298 does state that there is a presumption of
voluntariness when a defendant does not appear, such a presumption is contrary to case
law from this Court and the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, because the totality
of circumstances in Cotton demonstrated voluntariness, the presumption shifting
language was not necessary to the conclusion.
Moore recognizes that the defendant could have put on evidence at a motion for
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new trial which would refute the voluntariness conclusion made at the time the trial court
proceeded in absentia. Moore, 670 S.W.2d at 261. Such a recognition does not shift the
burden of establishing voluntariness. Instead, in cases where the totality of the
circumstances demonstrated a constitutional waiver and the court proceeded in absentia,
the defendant can later ask the court to reconsider based on additional information made
known to the court at a motion for new trial or to arrest judgment.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals outlined some things that the state might do
to establish a voluntary absence. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^[23. These possible
inquiries provide suggestions as to "avenues for establishing voluntariness," but are not
mandatory. Id. Instead, the possible suggested inquiries include information which,
under a totality of circumstances test, might tip the analysis in favor of a voluntariness
determination. The suggested possible avenues for establishing voluntariness include:
(1) finding out whether the defendant is incarcerated; (2) checking local hospitals; (3)
checking with defendant's employer; (4) checking defendant's residence or other contact
numbers; (5) checking with Pre-Trial Services; or (6) checking with the bail bond
company or person who posted bond. Id.
The state takes issue with this outline of possible inquiries it might make in order
to establish that a defendant has voluntarily waived his right to presence, arguing that the
approach is "aberrational" and no other jurisdiction "mandate[s] extensive investigational
inquiries like those that the court of appeals' opinion requires to rebut a presumption of
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involuntariness.M State's brief at 11. The state's criticism is easily dispensed with,
however, because Wanosik does not mandate that all of the inquiries listed be made.
Instead, Wanosik provides the list as a practical suggestion to prosecutors who hope to
proceed with a sentencing in absentia when a defendant does not appear.
Additionally, the list of possible inquiries is based on a review of case law and the
circumstances which affect the determination of whether an absence is voluntary as well
as common sense. For example, Houtz indicated that a defendant's incarceration is a
factor that weighs against a conclusion that the absence was voluntary. 714 P.2d at 678.
Moore indicates that a defendant's hospitalization weighs against a determination that the
absence is voluntary. 670 S.W.2d at 261. The unsuccessful efforts made to locate a
defendant are also factors that courts consider and rely on in concluding that the absence
is voluntary. See e,g. Cotton. 621 S.W.2d at 298. Checking with Pre-Trial Services, the
bail bond company, defendant's employer, and any contact numbers is simply a common
sense approach to attempting to locate the defendant; failure to locate the defendant after
such inquiries are made may support a determination that the absence is voluntary.
Given the strong presumption against waiver of the right to presence, the Court of
Appeals' suggestions are not aberrant and instead indicate some circumstances that might
demonstrate waiver.
The Court of Appeals' decision is based on Houtz. Anderson, and other precedent
which establish that there is a strong presumption against waiver and that the state has
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the burden of overcoming that presumption and establishing that the defendant
voluntarily waived his right to presence if the state wishes to proceed with a sentencing
in absentia. Additionally, the Court of Appeals' decision properly incorporates the
totality of the circumstances test for determining whether a defendant has voluntarily
waived his right to presence. Pursuant to controlling case law, the Court of Appeals
correctly concluded that the trial court erred in assuming that Wanosik's absence
established that he voluntarily waived his right to presence.
2. Policy Considerations Support the Court of Appeals' Conclusion that the Trial
Court Incorrectly Presumed that the Absence Was Voluntary.
The critical importance of the right to presence at sentencing supports the Court of
Appeals' reliance on the strong presumption against waiver of that right as well as the
court's suggestions as to factors which might overcome that presumption. f,[T]he
common law has traditionally required that the defendant be present at his sentencing."
United States v. Turner. 532 F. Supp. 913, 915 (D. No. Cal. 1982); see also United States
v. Lastra, 973 F.2d 952, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Presence is of critical
importance at sentencing not only because it allows judges to be presented with all
information necessary for a full and fair sentencing, but also because it allows the judge
to question and admonish the defendant. "It is only when the defendant is before the
court that a reasonable and rational sentencing can take place." State v. Fettis. 664 P.2d
208, 209 (Ariz. 1983).
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Presence is of instrumental value to the defendant for the exercise of other rights,
such as to present mitigating evidence and challenge aggravating evidence, and it
may also be advantageous to him that the decision maker be required to face him.
The state may have an interest in the presence of the defendant in order that the
example of personal admonition might deter others from similar crimes.
Moreover, it may sometimes be important that the convicted man be called to
account publicly for what he has done, not to be made an instrument of the general
deterrent, but to acknowledge symbolically his personal responsibility for his acts
and to receive personally the official expression of society's condemnation for his
conduct. The ceremonial rendering of judgment may also contribute to the
individual deterrent force of the sentence if the latter is accompanied by
appropriate judicial comment on the defendant's crime.
Turner. 532 F. Supp. at 915 (citation omitted).
A defendant's absence at sentencing does not carry the same potential for
"immobilizing] or frustrating] the justice system" as the defendant's absence at trial
carries. Id When trials are continued indefinitely because of an absent defendant,
witnesses may be lost and evidence may be compromised, making it difficult to obtain a
conviction. After a defendant has been convicted, however, such danger "has largely
although not entirely disappeared." Id. The conviction is in place and all that remains is
sentencing the defendant when he is located. The minimal risk associated with delay of
an appeal or possible retrial caused by postponing sentencing until a defendant is located
is far outweighed by the importance of a defendant's presence at sentencing. Id. 4

4

The possible collateral consequences claimed by the state in footnote 5 of its
brief at 14 do not outweigh the critical importance of the right to presence at sentencing.
Moreover, neither example of a collateral consequence of the Wanosik decision pans out
when scrutinized. For example, a judge can always order appropriate conditions for
pretrial release. This means that a judge can order that person charged with a crime not
possess weapons while out of jail on pretrial release. A conviction is not necessary.
18

In addition, presence at sentencing preserves the dignity of the individuals being
sentenced as well as the integrity of the system itself.
Respect for the dignity of the individual is at the base of the right of a man to be
present when society authoritatively proceeds to decide and announce whether it
will deprive him of life or how and to what extent it will deprive him of his
liberty. It shows a lack of fundamental respect for the dignity of a man to
sentence him in absentia. The presence of the defendant indicates that society has
sufficient confidence in the justness of its judgment to announce it in public to the
convicted man himself. Presence thus enhances the legitimacy and acceptability
of both sentence and conviction.
Id at 915-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Recognizing the importance of presence at sentencing and enforcing the
presumption against waiver of that right does not create an unworkable situation.
Wanosik does not say that defendants cannot be sentenced in absentia. Instead, it simply
reaffirms that the state must establish under the totality of the circumstances that an
absence was voluntary and the trial court cannot simply assume that because a defendant
is not present for sentencing, he has voluntarily waived his right to presence.
While the state is correct that many defendants fail to appear at sentencing, this is
the only Third District judge who routinely sentenced such people in absentia. In light

Moreover, sentencing a defendant in absentia and ordering that he not possess weapons
has little practical effect since the defendant is not present for the order. As far as the
state's second example, if a defendant is present and testifying so as to allow for
impeachment under rule 609, he will also have been picked up for the warrant for failing
to appear for sentencing. This means that by the time any trial was held where the prior
could be used for impeachment, sentencing would have occurred in the case where the
defendant failed to appear at sentencing.
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of the fact that a significant number of judges do not ordinarily sentence defendants in
absentia and the system has not been thwarted or rendered impotent, it is safe to assume
that the Court of Appeals' adherence to the presumption against waiver will not have the
devastating effects suggested by the state. See state's brief at 12-14.
Moreover, this is not a case where the defendant disappeared for a long time and
otherwise threatened the orderly administration ofjustice. Wanosik's pretrial sheet,
which was available to the trial judge had he been inclined to look, listed Wanosik's
home address. R. 8. Wanosik had lived in the area for 50 years and with his wife,
Pamela, for eighteen years. R. 8. He had three children, two of whom he was
supporting. R. 8. He had the same employer for a year and listed the employer's phone
number. R. 8. Had the trial judge continued sentencing to allow the parties to attempt to
locate Wanosik, he almost certainly would have been located and brought to court. In
fact, Wanosik was booked on the warrant shortly after the absentia sentencing. R. 56,
69. The state's overanxious concerns about the wheels of justice grinding to a halt if
courts are not allowed to sentence in absentia those defendants who do not appear at
sentencing simply do not apply to this case or any case where the defendant does not
appear at the first scheduled sentencing hearing and no effort is made to locate him.
As a final matter, the state argues that there are adequate remedies available for
people who are sentenced in absentia where it later turns out that the absence was not
voluntary. State's brief at 14. According to the state, the defendant can either request a
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review with the trial court or appeal the sentence.5 Wanosik did both and nevertheless
served the entire sentence even though the presentence report recommended twenty days.
These were empty remedies for Wanosik and any other defendant in similar
circumstances because any review of the sentence is conducted by the same judge who
sentenced the defendant in absentia; that judge can deny a review hearing. Additionally,
because the appellate process takes a long time, misdemeanor sentences are generally
served before the appeal is resolved, as was the case here.
The Court of Appeals followed existing case law, recognized the importance of
the right to presence, and provided a workable approach for cases in which a defendant
fails to appear at sentencing. In cases where the state is adamant about proceeding with
the sentencing, the state will make the appropriate inquiry, as it has done in a significant
number of cases since the Wanosik decision was issued. Precluding sentencing courts
from presuming voluntariness based solely on the defendant's absence helps preserve the
sacredness of the right to presence, the integrity of the system, the dignity of the
individual defendant, and the protections required by due process at sentencing.
B. WANOSIK DID NOT KNOWINGLY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO PRESENCE.
As is the case with voluntariness, the state was required to establish that Wanosik
knowingly waived his right to presence at sentencing. The presumption against waiver

5

The state also suggests that a defendant could file a post-conviction writ. That
was not true for Wanosik, whose appeal was pending when he was arrested.
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applies with equal force to the knowledge aspect of the waiver test.
In order to knowingly waive the right to presence, the record must establish not
only that Wanosik knew the date of his sentencing hearing, but also that he knew the
sentencing would proceed even if he were not present. See. United States v. McPherson.
421 F.2d 1127, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (recognizing that in order for a waiver to be
knowing, record must establish not only that defendant knew of his right to be present,
but also that defendant knew that trial would proceed if he were not there). While
knowledge that the trial will commence if the defendant is not present cannot be imputed
to the defendant who does not appear at the start of his trial (see. Crosby, 506 U.S. at
261), a defendant who flees mid-trial is likely to know that the trial will go on without
him. Id at 261. The Crosby Court stated:
"Since the notion that trial may be commenced in absentia still seems to shock
most lawyers, it would hardly be appropriate to impute knowledge that this will
occur to their clients.'1 Starkey, Trial in Absentia, 54 N.Y. St. 262 B.J. 30, 34
n. 28 (1982). It is unlikely, on the other hand, "'that a defendant who flees from a
courtroom in the midst of a trial - - where judge, jury, witnesses and lawyers are
present and ready to continue - - would not know that as a consequence the trial
could continue in his absence.'" Tavlor v. United States. 414 U.S. 17, 20, 94 S.Ct.
194, 196, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) [further citation omitted].
Id
Just as knowledge that a trial will commence in the defendant's absence cannot be
imputed to a defendant, knowledge that a judge will sentence a defendant if the
defendant is not present cannot be imputed to a defendant. Because any sentence
imposed by a judge needs to be carried out, it seems likely that defendants would assume
22

that they need to be present in order for the sentencing to proceed. Moreover, due to the
critical importance of presence to sentencing, several jurisdictions refuse to allow
sentencing in absentia unless there are extraordinary circumstances. Fettis. 664 P.2d at
209.
Extraordinary circumstances which would allow for sentencing in absentia, while
"rare indeed" (idL), include circumstances where the defendant expressly waived his right
to be present at sentencing. Turner. 532 F. Supp. at 916 (citing United States v. Brown.
456 F.2d 1112, 1114 (5th Cir. 1972V cert, denied. 415 U.S. 960 (1974)). Extraordinary
circumstances allowing sentencing in absentia may also include circumstances where the
defendant has been fully informed that sentencing will proceed in his absence if he does
not appear. See Lowerv v. State. 759 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Ark. 1988) (court is "unwilling
to hold that the fundamental right to be present at sentencing was knowingly waived in
the absence of language specifically advising an accused that he is subject to being
sentenced prospectively without his being present"); People v. Link. 685 N.E.2d 624,
626 (111. App. 1997) (in order to try or sentence defendant in absentia, state must
establish defendant had knowledge of the date of the proceeding and was warned that the
proceedings could go on without him if he did not appear); People v. Bennett . 557
N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (sentencing in absentia upheld where
defendant was fully advised of the consequences of failing to appear and agreed to being
sentenced in absentia if he intentionally failed to appear).
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Requiring that a defendant be informed that the sentencing will proceed in his
absence in order to find a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence is
consistent with this Court's decision in Anderson. Anderson was warned of the
consequences of failing to appear and signed a written waiver of his right to presence if
he did not appear. Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110. This Court's holding in Anderson that
the right to presence was knowingly and voluntarily waived fits squarely with a
requirement that the defendant must be informed that the proceedings will go on without
him in order to find a knowing waiver of the right to presence.
Moreover, in Anderson, this Court explicitly relied on McPherson. stating, ,f[t]o
intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must have notice of the
proceedings. United States v. McPherson. 421 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1969)."
Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110. Since the notice required in McPherson was notice that the
hearing would proceed even if the defendant was not present, and Anderson had notice
that the proceedings would continue without him if he did not appear, the reliance on
McPherson appears to require that a defendant be given notice that the hearing will
proceed in his absence in order to find a knowing waiver of the right to presence.
The Court of Appeals rejected the requirement that a defendant be given notice of
the consequences of his nonappearance, and instead held that a waiver is knowing if the
defendant is given notice of the date and time of the hearing. Wanosik. 2001 UT App
241, Tf 11 -16. The lower court thought that requiring notice of the consequences of
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nonappearance would allow defendants to impede the orderly administration of justice by
failing to appear. IdL, fl2. This reasoning ignores the likelihood that without such
notice, a defendant would not know that sentencing was to proceed without him and the
fact that in most cases, the administration of justice is not significantly delayed because
most defendants who fail to appear are picked up on a warrant shortly thereafter.
Additionally, any risk of impeding the orderly administration of justice by not
proceeding in absentia at sentencing is minimal because the conviction has already been
secured and any sentence imposed in absentia cannot be carried out until the defendant is
back before the court. Regardless of whether the absent defendant is sentenced, a bench
warrant will be issued and the defendant will be subject to being picked up and jailed.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the requirement that the defendant know of the
consequences of his failure to appear because, according to the court, M[t]he United
States Supreme Court has . . . explicitly rejected McPherson's holding requiring such a
warning. See Taylor. 414 U.S. at 20 n.3, 94 S.Ct. at 196 n.3 ('[T]he Court of
Appeals . . . disagreed with McPherson, and, in our view, rightly so.'" Wanosik, 2001
UT App 241, ^fl3. While Taylor did reject the holding in McPherson that a defendant
who flees mid-trial must be warned of the consequences of his absence in order for there
to be a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence, Taylor did not reject the
more general concept in McPherson that for there to be a knowing waiver of the right to
presence, the defendant must know that the proceeding will go forward in his absence.
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As the United States Supreme Court explained, a defendant who flees mid-trial after a
jury has been selected and where witnesses and lawyers are present knows that the trial
will proceed even if he is not there. Crosby. 505 U.S. at 261-62. McPherson therefore
acted knowingly when he absented himself mid-trial and notice that the trial would
proceed without him was not necessary under those circumstances. This Court's citation
in McPherson for the proposition that any waiver of the right to be present must be
knowing, despite the language in Taylor, demonstrates that the McPherson requirement
that the defendant must know the consequences of the nonappearance in order to waive
the right to presence has continuing vitality after Taylor.
Finally, the Court of Appeals rejected the distinction in Crosby between mid-trial
and pretrial flight by reasoning that the language of Fed. R. Crim. 23 makes that
distinction and therefore the Crosby distinction is based on the federal rules and not
constitutional concerns. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^[14-15. While Crosby was
decided based on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the concern in Crosby that
defendants who do not appear at the commencement of trial-or sentencing-do not know
that the case will proceed without them touches on constitutional concerns. A defendant
who does not know that the case will proceed in his absence has not knowingly waived
his right to presence and therefore should not be sentenced in absentia. Since nothing in
the record establishes that Wanosik knew he would be sentenced in absentia, Wanosik
did not knowingly waive his right to presence.
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C. THIS COURT SHOULD REQUIRE THAT PUBLIC INTEREST IN
PROCEEDING OUTWEIGH THE DEFENDANT'S INTEREST IN BEING
PRESENT IN ORDER TO SENTENCE A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT IN
ABSENTIA.
In addition to requiring that any waiver of the right to presence must be knowingly
and voluntarily made, this Court should utilize its supervisory power6 to require trial
courts to weigh the public interest in proceeding against the defendant's interest in being
present before allowing a defendant to be sentenced in absentia. Requiring trial courts to
balance the public interest in proceeding against the defendant's interest in being present
ensures that trial courts "vigorously safeguard" the right to presence. United States v.
Fontanez. 878 F. 2d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1989). The factors to be considered when
balancing such interests include "the possibility that [the] defendant could be located
within a reasonable period of time, the difficulty of rescheduling," and the burden on the
state in not proceeding. People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d 136, 140-42,440 N.E.2d 131 (N.Y.
1982). Application of such a balancing test helps make sure that only those cases where
sentencing must proceed to preserve the state's interests go forward in the absence of the
defendant, thereby protecting the right to presence along with the state's interests.

6

State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34,ffl[12-14,999 P.2d 1 (Durham, J., concurring),
outlines numerous circumstances in which this Court has exercised its supervisory
power. A review of that list demonstrates that requiring trial courts to balance the public
interest in proceeding against the defendant's interest in being present before proceeding
in absentia is an appropriate area for this Court to exercise its supervisory powers. The
importance of the right to presence, the integrity of the system, and respect for the dignity
of individual defendants all require that this Court exert its supervisory influence in this
context.
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Various courts require that the interests of the parties be weighed before a court
can sentence a defendant in absentia. See. Smith v. Mann. 173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir.
1999) (Mthe public interest in proceeding [must] clearly outweigh[] the interest of the
voluntarily absent defendant in attending" in order to proceed in absentia); Fontanez .
878 F.2d at 36-37 (same); Pinknev v. State. 711 A.2d 205, 219 (Md. 1998) (even if a
defendant makes a constitutionally adequate waiver of his right to presence, court must
consider all relevant factors before proceeding in absentia); Parker, 440 N.E.2d at 131517 (same). In Anderson, this Court also considered practical considerations, thereby
employing a balancing test, before concluding that Anderson should be sentenced in
absentia. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111.
A requirement that courts balance the interests before proceeding in absentia
when there is a waiver is based on "the recognition that the public interest and
confidence injudicial proceedings is best served by the presence of the defendant...."
Pinknev, 711 A.2d at 214. Fairness, the appearance of justice, and the efficient
administration of cases are all served by such a balancing test. In the sentencing context,
such a balancing test recognizes the importance of a defendant's presence at sentencing
not only so that he can give appropriate input to the court regarding information pertinent
to sentencing, but also so that the court can address the defendant. Not all cases in which
a defendant has waived his or her right to presence require that the state proceed in the
absence of the defendant. See Pinknev. 711 P.2d at 214. Employing the balancing test
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limits those cases that proceed in absentia to cases where such a procedure is necessary.
The balancing test also lays to rest any concern about defendants who are trying to
manipulate the system by not appearing. In cases where not proceeding would affect the
administration of justice, the balancing test works in favor of proceeding in absentia.
Application of the balancing test in this case demonstrates that the public interest
in proceeding did not outweigh Wanosik's interest in being present. Wanosik could have
been easily located and brought into court. He had lived in the area for fifty years and
had a stable marital and work history. R. 8. His home address and employer's address
and phone number were in the court file. R. 8. Given Wanosik's stability and ties to the
community, it is probable that he could have been "located within a reasonable period of
time" had the judge continued sentencing. Parker, 440 N.E.2d at 1317.
The record does not show any burden on the state which would be caused by
continuing the sentencing date. In fact, the favorable recommendation by AP&P, the
minimal jail sentence recommended and the recommendation for treatment all
demonstrate that society's interests would have been better served by rescheduling
sentencing and bringing Wanosik before the court so that he would hear and understand
the basis for the sentence and receive a sentence which included drug treatment rather
than an extended jail stay.
Moreover, because sentencing hearings take a relatively short amount of time and
appear on calendars with other sentencings and less time consuming matters,
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rescheduling would not have been difficult. Because all of the considerations weighed in
favor of rescheduling sentencing, society's interests and those of Wanosik would have
been best served by continuing this sentencing. Judge Frederick therefore erred in
sentencing Wanosik in absentia.
D. THE ERROR IN SENTENCING WANOSIK IN ABSENTIA WAS
HARMFUL.
When the court errs in sentencing in absentia, the remedy is to require a new
sentencing without considering harm. See. generally State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064,
1071 (Utah 1993) (vacating sentence which was imposed in violation of due process),
superceded bv statute on other grounds. 2000 UT App 230, 8 P.3d 274. Assuming,
arguendo, a harmless error review is conducted, however, the focus is on the likelihood
of a more favorable sentence if the defendant had been present. In this case, where
AP&P recommended only twenty days jail based on Wanosik's favorable background
but the judge imposed the maximum based only on Wanosik's nonappearance, the record
demonstrates the error in proceeding in absentia was harmful.7

7

The Court of Appeals employed an incorrect analysis in assessing harm. Rather
than remanding for a new sentencing based on the constitutional error or focusing on the
likelihood of a more favorable outcome, the Court of Appeals concluded that the error
was harmless because Wanosik later wrote a letter indicating that he did not have a
"legitimate excuse" for not being present at sentencing. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241,
126.
Wanosik's letter, written after he was in jail, is not pertinent to the issue of
whether at the time of sentencing, Judge Frederick erred in proceeding in absentia since
that letter was not available to the judge when he decided to proceed in absentia. The
letter also does not relate to a determination as to whether the error in proceeding in
30

POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R. CRIM.
P. 22 IN SENTENCING WANOSIK TO THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM
WITHOUT BASING THAT SENTENCE ON RELEVANT AND RELIABLE
INFORMATION AND WITHOUT AFFORDING COUNSEL THE
OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK AT SENTENCING.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge violated Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and
due process when he sentenced Wanosik in absentia without affording counsel the
opportunity to address factors relevant to sentencing and without basing the sentence on
reliable and relevant information. The Court of Appeals' decision was correct and
should be upheld by his Court because (1) Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) furthers the due
process requirements at sentencing by mandating that the trial court afford counsel the

absentia was harmful because it does not relate to the effect of the error on the
sentencing outcome. Instead, information which comes to light after a trial court has
properly proceeded in absentia based on the circumstances known at the time of the
decision is relevant to any attack on the decision to proceed in absentia made in a motion
for new trial or to arrest judgment. When a court finds a valid waiver and proceeds in
absentia, some "courts have reached the conclusion that the trial court has an obligation
at a subsequent court proceeding to allow a criminal defendant the opportunity to explain
the circumstances surrounding an absence at trial." Pinkney. 711 A.2d at 213-14. In this
case, however, the initial conclusion was erroneous so a later reconsideration of
Wanosik's reasons for being absent was not required.
Moreover, Wanosik's letter does not fully consider the circumstances surrounding
his nonappearance and is not a substitute for a hearing where counsel is present and
might have been able to convey the reasons for Wanosik's nonappearance. The letter
does not indicate Wanosik's reasons for not being present and instead simply indicates
that he did not have a legitimate excuse. Wanosik may not have known, however, what a
legitimate excuse might be. Confusion about the date, as suggested by defense counsel,
could be a legitimate reason for not attending, but Wanosik might not have realized that.
In the absence of a hearing, Wanosik's letter labeling his reason for not attending but not
specifying that reason does not establish that Wanosik knowingly and voluntarily waived
his right to presence.
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opportunity to speak regarding factors relevant to sentencing; (2) the illegally imposed
sentence was properly reviewed on appeal pursuant to rule 22(e); and (3) due process
requires that all criminal sentences be based on relevant and reliable information.
A. RULE 22(a) MANDATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT AFFORD
COUNSEL AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS FACTORS RELEVANT TO
SENTENCING.
The state and federal due process clauses "require[] that a sentencing judge act on
reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a
sentence." State v. Howell. 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985); Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1071.
A sentence which is not based on reliable and relevant information must be vacated. See
id. (vacating sentence based on unreliable PSR); State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005, 1009
(Utah 1982) (vacating sentence where defendant was not supplied with a copy of PSR).
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) effectuates the due process requirement that a sentence be
based on relevant and reliable information by requiring judges to give both parties the
opportunity to present relevant information; see. Howell. 707 P.2d at 118 ("[t]o ensure
fairness in the sentencing procedure, [Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)] directs trial courts to hear
evidence from both the defendant and the prosecution that is relevant to the sentence to
be imposed"). Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) states in part:
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The
prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information
material to the imposition of sentence.
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Rule 22(a) mandates that the court afford a defendant the opportunity not only to
exercise his right to allocution8, but also to present any information which might mitigate
the sentence or indicate that sentence should not be imposed. Since counsel acts as an
advocate for defendant, the rule also requires that defense counsel be given the
opportunity to make a statement and present any information in mitigation of
punishment. See generally Casarez. 656 P.2d at 1007 ("[sentencing is a critical stage of
a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of
counsel"). Affording defense counsel the opportunity to make a statement and provide
information in mitigation of sentence furthers the due process requirement of a fair and
reliable sentencing proceeding in addition to ensuring that a defendant facing sentencing
is afforded his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Id. When the defendant is not
present, affording defense counsel the opportunity to speak may provide the only means
by which to present information in mitigation of punishment to the court.
Recognizing the role of counsel at sentencing and interpreting rule 22(a) to meet
Sixth Amendment protections, the Court of Appeals concluded that an absent defendant
nevertheless has the right to exercise his rule 22(a) rights through counsel. Wanosik,

8

The right to allocution is guaranteed by Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and the Utah
Constitution. See State v. Young. 853 P.2d 327, 379-73 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (joined by Stewart, J., and Zimmerman, J., in holding that rule
22(a) includes right to allocution); see. also Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 (right to
allocution at sentencing is "an inseparable part of the right to be present," guaranteed by
Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
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2001 UT App 241, ^[30. In addition, the court recognized that the rule "unequivocally
directs" sentencing judges to give the prosecution an opportunity to address sentencing
factors and ,f[i]t would be patently unfair, in the case of an absent defendant, to hear only
from the prosecuting attorney and not from defense counsel regarding sentencing
considerations." Id Moreover, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the language of the
rule and case law require the trial judge to offer defense counsel the opportunity to speak
regarding sentencing factors regardless of whether counsel requests such an opportunity.
The language of the rule is that "the court shall afford the defendant an
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the rule imposes an
affirmative obligation on the trial court to extend the opportunity to be heard; it
does not contemplate the court will passively wait for counsel to make a request to
be heard. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has said that rule 22(a) "directs
trial courts to hear evidence from both the defendant and the prosecution that is
relevant to the sentence to be imposed." State v. Howell. 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah
1985) [footnote omitted]. This directive is nowhere made conditional on a
preliminary request by counsel to present the information. Even if a defendant is
voluntarily absent, the trial court has the duty to set its aggravation aside and
impose a reasonable sentence, and to that end the court is required to hear
evidence from both sides relevant to sentencing. The onus is thus on the trial
court to "afford" the defendant and to "give" the prosecutor the opportunity to
present relevant information, [footnote omitted]. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). The
trial court in this case erred by not affording defense counsel an opportunity to
present information in mitigation of punishment or giving the prosecutor the
opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing.
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^[32 (emphasis added).
Relying on a single case interpreting the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
state argues that while a federal court is required to extend "an affirmative invitation to
the defendant to speak" regardless of whether the defendant requested an opportunity to
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do so, the same affirmative obligation to give defense counsel an opportunity to speak is
not required. State's brief at 17-18 (citing United States v. Vasquez. 216 F.3d 456, 45859 (5th Cir.) cert denied, 531 U.S. 972 (2000)). Asidefromthe obvious problems of
relying on Vasquez because it is the only case reaching this decision and interprets the
federal rules, Vasquez also does not provide guidance because the circumstances were
substantially different. The defendant was present in Vasquez and the judge extended
the opportunity to the defendant to speak at sentencing. The court held under those
circumstances, there was no obligation under the federal rules to extend an opportunity to
speak to counsel who was present and did not ask to speak. By contrast, in the present
case, defendant was not present and there was no attempt by the trial court to consider
factors relevant to sentencing. While the sentencing court in Vasquez heard from the
defendant and made an attempt to consider relevant factors, the court in this case did not.
Other courts appear to take the requirement that the "shall afford" the opportunity
at face value. See e ^ United States v. Sisti. 91 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Bvars. 290 F.2d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 1961); Statev.Koon. 440 S.E.2d 442, 451
(W.Va. 1993). Those cases parrot the language of the rule and require a court to afford
defense counsel the opportunity to speak before imposing sentence.
Requiring trial courts to let counsel know s/he can speak on behalf of the
defendant will help ensure that full and fair sentencing hearings occur and will not
encourage invited error. The rule is and will be clear to trial courts: they must ask for
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input from defense counsel or the sentence will not be legally imposed. This requirement
imposes no burden to trial courts and is in fact the procedure utilized by most sentencing
judges regardless of whether defense counsel asks to speak.
The state also argues that requiring courts to solicit information from both parties
could lead to absurd results because a sentence might be vacated because the prosecutor
was not given the opportunity to speak. State's brief at 19. In order to vacate a sentence
on rule 22(a) grounds under Wanosik. noncompliance with rule 22(a) must be harmful in
that the outcome for the defendant may have been more favorable absent the error.
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^33. An error in failing to give the prosecutor the
opportunity to speak would be harmful only when the prosecutor had information in
mitigation of sentencing. In such circumstances, it would not be absurd to vacate a
sentence; fairness and due process would require that the sentencing court hear such
information if it might affect the sentencing determination.9
Because the rule requires the court to afford the defendant the opportunity to
speak, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court violated the rule when

9

The state suggests that the rule 22(a) analysis has already been taken to an
improper extreme in State v. Hamling, 2001 UT App 267 (unpublished); see
Addendum D. In Hamling., defense counsel was given the opportunity to speak at
sentencing, but the prosecutor was not given such an opportunity. Hamling did not argue
on appeal that rule 22(a) was violated. Instead, he argued that the trial court erred in
sentencing him in absentia, and the Court of Appeals agreed. The state's purported
concern about absurd extensions of Wanosik and its reliance on Hamling for that
proposition are misplaced.
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it concluded that Wanosik waived his right to presence then proceeded to sentence
Wanosik without pausing and without giving defense counsel an opportunity to address
factors relevant to sentencing. This approach furthers the due process goal of a full and
fair sentencing hearing.
B. THE UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(a) VIOLATION WAS PROPERLY
REVIEWED PURSUANT TO UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e).
The state also claims that the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing the sentence
pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). According to the state, the Court of Appeals was
required to employ a plain error review because a sentence imposed in violation of
rule 22(a) is not an illegally imposed sentence which qualifies for review at any time.10

10

Petitioner's claim that the Court of Appeals incorrectly proceeded under
rule 22(e) relates only to the rule 22(a) violation. The Court of Appeals did not rely on
rule 22(e) to reach the error in sentencing Wanosik in absentia or the error in sentencing
him in violation of the due process requirement that sentences be based on relevant and
reliable information. Wanosik. 2001 Ut App 241, ^|28, n. 11.
The due process claims relating to sentencing Wanosik in absentia and without
conducting a full sentencing hearing or relying on relevant and reliable information were
preserved in this case. R. 54:2-4. In fact, after the trial court proceeded to sentence
Wanosik without giving either party an opportunity to speak, defense counsel attempted
to interject her objection. She was part way through her objection when the court cut her
off. Defense counsel stated, "Judge, I would object to that order because I don't think
that it takes into account his due process rights or his rights about - -." R. 54:4. The state
does not argue that reviewing the due process and absentia issues was error. See
Petitioner's brief at 20.
Moreover, Wanosik and the many other defendants who brought this issue to the
Court of Appeals argued that the error could be reviewed under the plain error doctrine.
See Wanosik's reply brief at 2-3. The plain language of rule 22(a) and the due process
requirements at sentencing as outlined in, inter alia, Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1071 made the
error in not affording counsel the opportunity to speak and not basing the sentence on
relevant information obvious. The error prejudiced Wanosik since the presentence report
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As a preliminary matter, this Court should refuse to review this claim because the
state did not raise that issue in its petition for writ of certiorari, and an argument that the
issue was not properly reviewed by the Court of Appeals and therefore the Court of
Appeals should be overruled on procedural grounds is not fairly included in the questions
presented by the state in its petition. See Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell. 966 P.2d 852,
856 (Utah 1998) (review limited to issues raised in petitions or fairly included therein).
Moreover, the state's claim that rule 22(e) does not apply to this illegally imposed
sentence is incorrect. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) provides that ff[t]he court may correct an
illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim.
P. 22(e) (emphasis added). The state's argument that the sentence imposed in violation
of Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) is not an illegal sentence for rule 22(e) purposes disregards the
language of the rule that allows for review not only of an illegal sentence, but also of a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner.
Rule 22(e) allows a trial or appellate court to review an illegal sentence or a
sentence imposed in an illegal manner at any time. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859
(Utah 1995). Allowing an appellate court to vacate a sentence pursuant to rule 22(e).

recommended only twenty days of jail and, instead, the trial judge imposed the statutory
maximum.
The Court of Appeals therefore had several means by which it could review these
errors: straight preservation, Utah Rule Crim. P. 22(e) and plain error. Even if the state
were correct in its rule 22(e) analysis, which it is not, this issue could properly be vacated
on appeal either as plain error or because the trial court did not allow defense counsel to
fully state her objection.
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even though the issue was not raised below "makes theoretical sense because an illegal
sentence is void and, like issues of jurisdiction, should be raisable at any time." IcL at
860. In addition, "considerations of judicial economy" also support the determination
that an appellate court can review a challenge to a sentence pursuant to rule 22(e) which
is raised for the first time on appeal. Id.
While rule 22(e) allows an appellate court to review a challenge to the legality of a
sentence which is raised for the first time on appeal, rule 22(e) "does not allow an
appellate court to review the legality of a sentence when the substance of the appeal is
not a challenge to the sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction." Id_ In other
words, "[a] request to correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e) presupposes a valid
conviction" and "issues concerning the validity of a conviction are not cognizable under
rule 22(e)." IcL On the other hand, challenges to the legality of the sentence are
reviewable under rule 22(e).
The rationale outlined by this Court in Brooks for allowing an appellate court to
review an illegal sentence when the issue is raised for the first time on appeal applies
with equal force to this case. The sentence is illegal because the correct procedure for
imposing sentence was not utilized; the sentence therefore is void. Considerations of
judicial economy support the notion that the sentence should have been vacated on
appeal rather than requiring the defendant to seek relief elsewhere.
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A rule 22(a) violation fits within the types of matters which can be reviewed under
rule 22(e). Not only is the sentence illegal because it was imposed without due process
or rule 22(a) protections, it also was imposed in an illegal manner because Judge
Frederick failed to comply with rule 22(a). Pursuant to the plain language of rule 22(e),
this illegally imposed sentence could be reviewed for the first time on appeal.
The state's argument that this case does not fit within the categories of cases in
which this Court has reviewed an error under rule 22(e) is not convincing. See State's
brief at 21-24. The rule does not limit review to cases in which the sentence is
ambiguous, the court lacks jurisdiction, or the sentence exceeds that which is authorized
by law. Instead, rule 22(e) applies to any illegal sentence or any sentence imposed in an
illegal manner. Just because this Court has not yet addressed a rule 22(a) claim pursuant
to rule 22(e) does not mean that such a claim does not fall within the rule.
Moreover, the state's list of cases which have held that the claim cannot be
addressed under rule 22(e) support the notion that Wanosik's attack on his sentence was
properly reviewed under rule 22(e). All of the cases listed by the state in which a Utah
appellate court has refused to review a claim under rule 22(e) involve attacks on the
conviction rather than the sentence.
State v. Wareham is the only case cited by the state in support of this argument
which merits comment. 801 P.2d 918 , 919-920 & n. 3 (Utah 1990). In Wareham. like
the other cases where this Court has refused to review an issue under rule 22(e), the
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defendant was attacking his conviction rather than his sentence. After Wareham's
conviction was affirmed on appeal, Wareham raised a new issue, claiming that the
aggravated sexual abuse of a child statute was improperly applied to him because it was
enacted after his crime. The change in the statute elevated a second degree felony sexual
abuse of a child to a first degree felony aggravated sexual abuse of a child if the added
element that the defendant committed five or more acts was found. This Court rejected
Wareham's arguments in his second appeal because they were an attack on his conviction
which should have been brought in the original appeal. Id. at 920. While the Court did
not directly analyze the application of rule 22(e) in this context, a conclusion that the
claim could not be reviewed pursuant to rule 22(e) is consistent with this Court's case
law which limits rule 22(e) review to challenges to the sentence.
The state's claim that Wareham involved a sentencing enhancement and is an
example of a case where this Court refused rule 22(e) review where ,f[t]he trial court
bases its sentencing on inappropriate factors" (state's brief at 23) is simply incorrect.
Wareham involved an attack on the conviction and rule 22(e) treatment was therefore
improper. Moreover, as the state recognizes (State's brief at 24 n. 9), the recent decision
in State v. Maeuire, 1999 UT App 45, ^[6 n. 1, 975 P.2d 476 recognizes that this type of
issue can be reviewed for the first time on appeal under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e).
The state's reliance on New Jersey and Florida case law is likewise not
compelling. Those cases do not deal with this situation, are not persuasive, and are based
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on rules which do not contain the same language as the Utah rule. Indeed, neither rule
includes language regarding imposition of a sentence in an illegal manner.
Rule 22(e) is designed to allow review in precisely this type of case. There is no
question the trial judge ignored the requirements of due process and rule 22(a) when he
sentenced Wanosik. The illegality of these sentences requires review and rule 22(e)
plainly allows for such review.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
WANOSIK'S SENTENCE MUST BE VACATED WHERE THE TRIAL
JUDGE DID NOT CONDUCT A FULL AND FAIR SENTENCING HEARING
AND THE SENTENCE WAS NOT BASED ON RELEVANT AND RELIABLE
INFORMATION.
" A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of
his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which
underlie the criminal justice system.11 State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah
1980). Although a sentencing judge has discretion in imposing sentence, s/he must
nevertheless impose sentence in a reliable manner which fits due process requirements.
Indeed, Utah appellate courts "have consistently sought 'to shore up the soundness and
reliability of the factual basis upon which the judge must rely in the exercise of that
sentencing discretion/" Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, ^[34 (quoting State v. Lipskv, 608
P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980)). A sentence which is not based on reliable and relevant
information must be vacated. Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1071-75; Casarez. 656 P.2d at 1009.
The Court of Appeals recognized the due process requirements and need for
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reliability at sentencing in this case. Because the record failed to disclose any factor
other than Wanosik's absence from sentencing upon which the sentencing court relied,
the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had violated due process. The Court stated:
The record in this case fails to disclose any relevant or reliable information,
other than the fact that defendant was absent from the proceeding, relied on by the
trial court in imposing maximum - - albeit concurrent - - sentences for both
crimes. Voluntary absence from sentencing may properly serve as one factor in
determining an appropriate sentence, as it is an indirect - - but telling - - indication
of the defendant's suitability for probation or susceptibility to rehabilitative
efforts. It is not, however, sufficient to rely on that fact alone in deciding what
sentence to impose, nor may such absence be punished by imposing a sentence
more severe than is otherwise warranted. From all that appears in the record,
however, Wanosik's absence at sentencing was the only information considered
by the trial court in deciding what sentences to impose.
Wanosik's Due Process rights were compromised by the trial court's failure
to base its sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information regarding the
crime, Wanosik's background, and the interests of society. For the same reasons
noted in the preceding section, the trial court's failure to base its sentencing
decision on relevant and reliable information was not harmless.
Id. 1135-36.
1. Although the Court of Appeals Did Not Hold that Due Process Requires the
Sentencing Judge to Solicit Information from the Parties, Such a Requirement Fits
within the Due Process Requirements at Sentencing.
The state argues that the decision is incorrect because due process does not require
the trial court to affirmatively solicit sentencing information. Petitioner's brief at 28.
While the Court of Appeals held that Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) required the trial judge to
afford defense counsel the opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing, it
did not directly hold that due process required the court to solicit such information.
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Instead, the Court of Appeals held that due process required the trial judge to base his
sentencing decision on reliable and relevant information, and that M[t]he record in this
case fails to disclose any relevant or reliable information, other than the fact that
defendant was absent from the proceeding, relied on by the trial court in imposing
maximum - - albeit concurrent - - sentences for both crimes." Wanosik, 2001 UT App
241, Tff35-36. That holding is firmly grounded in Utah case law. See e.g. Johnson, 856
P.2d at 1071; Howell. 707 P.2d at 118; Lipskv. 608 P.2d at 249.
Although the Court of Appeals based its due process analysis on the trial court's
"failure to base its sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information," requiring
the judge to affirmatively solicit sentencing input as part of the due process protection at
sentencing would ensure that due process concerns are met at sentencing. In any case
where the judge does not have reliable and relevant sentencing information before him,
soliciting that information from counsel facilitates the requirement that the sentencing
decision be based on relevant and reliable information while also ensuring that a full and
fair sentencing hearing is held.
The state argues, however, that soliciting sentencing information from the parties
is not required by due process based on a single case issued by this Court over thirty
years ago. See state's brief at 28-29. According to the state, State v. Kelbach, 461 P.2d
297, 299 (Utah 1969), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 935 (1972), which concluded that the
failure to ask a defendant, who is represented by counsel, whether he wants to exercise
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his allocution right "does not in itself constitute constitutional error," resolves this issue.
Kelbach does not resolve the issue of whether due process requires a sentencing
court to solicit information from the parties for a number of reasons. First, Kelbach
discusses a defendant's right to allocution, not the defendant's due process right to have
sentencing based on relevant and reliable information. Kelbach was represented by
counsel and a penalty hearing was otherwise held. In that context, where the sentencing
authority was presented with information relevant to sentencing, this Court simply
concluded that the trial court was not also required to ask the defendant whether he
wanted to speak. Kelbach involved an entirely different situation than the present case
where no information relevant to sentencing was presented.
Second, Kelbach leaves open the possibility that while failing to ask the defendant
whether he wants to allocute "does not in itself constitute constitutional error,"
when coupled with a failure to solicit any information relevant to sentencing,
constitutional error might occur. In other words, Kelbach does not address the situation
in the present case where no information is presented to the sentencing court.
Third, Kelbach is disfavored not only because it has been overruled, but also
because the passage of time and changes in the law bring its conclusion into question.
See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 376-77 (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting). The
more recent decisions of Anderson, Johnson, Howell, Lipsky, and Young all bring into
question what continuing life, if any, this conclusion in Kelbach might have.
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Finally, Kelbach does not resolve the issue of whether the sentencing judge must
solicit information from the parties because, at most, Kelbach addresses only federal
constitutional concerns. See Young, 853 P.2d at 377 (Durham, J., concurring and
dissenting). The due process protections at sentencing embraced in Johnson. Howell and
Lipsky are all firmly rooted in the state constitutional due process protection. Those
cases suggest that a sentencing judge is required to solicit information from parties in
order to meet state due process concerns at sentencing.
2. The Court of Appeals Correctly Held that the Record Failed to Show that the
Trial Court Based the Imposition of the Statutory Maximum Sentence on Relevant
and Reliable Information.
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the record does not include any
relevant or reliable information, other than Wanosik's absence, which was relied on by
the trial court in imposing the maximum sentence. See. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241,
Tf30. While defense counsel indicated on the record that the presentence report was
favorable, she was not afforded the opportunity to discuss specific information or
recommendations in the report. R. 54:1-4. Nor did the judge acknowledge the
information or recommendations in the presentence report during the hearing. See
generally R. 54. Instead, the trial court concluded that Wanosik was voluntarily absent
and moved immediately into sentencing him to the maximum term. R. 54:2-4.
The trial court's gross deviation from the PSR recommendation without
acknowledging the details of the PSR or indicating the basis for the deviation
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demonstrates that the judge failed to consider the information in the PSR when assessing
sentence. When that gross deviation is considered in the context of the hearing, where
the judge focused only on the defendant's absence and did not seem to think any
additional information was necessary in order to sentence Wanosik, it is apparent that the
judge did not consider additional factors. Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)
(1999) requires that the trial court receive information relevant to sentencing in open
court. In this case, the only information presented in open court was the fact of
Wanosik's absence. The record more than adequately demonstrates that the judge based
the sentence solely on Wanosik's absence.
In addition, however, the Court of Appeals had a number of other appeals pending
before it in which this same judge sentenced defendants to the statutory maximum when
the defendant did not appear at sentencing. See footnote 1, supra at 2. In each case, the
judge imposed the statutory maximum based solely on the defendant's absence. These
other cases further demonstrate that the judge did not consider relevant and reliable
information and instead based the decision to impose the maximum sentence solely on
Wanosik's absence.
A review of the record further demonstrates that relevant factors did not support
the imposition of a maximum sentence. Wanosik was convicted of class A attempted
possession of a controlled substance and class B possession after he was detained and
searched when found rummaging through a Deseret Industries bin of donated items.
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R. 5-6, 18-23. The AP&P agents, who are experienced in preparing presentence reports
and supervising probation, lfbelieve[] the defendant is a good candidate for some type of
supervised probation." PSR at 10. Based on Wanosik's background and the relatively
minor nature of the crimes, the PSR recommends that Wanosik serve twenty days of jail,
with credit for the eight days, then be placed on probation. PSR at 11.
Additional information supported probation rather than a maximum sentence.
Wanosik had been married for twenty-four years and had a relatively stable work history.
PSR at 5, 8. He had only one conviction in 1995 for retail theft. PSR at 4.11 This
additional favorable information further demonstrates that the sentence was not based on
relevant and reliable factors.
The state complains that reviewing the context of this record and concluding that
the judge based the sentence solely on absence conflicts with the presumption of
regularity. The application of such a presumption as the state suggests would curtail the
constitutional protections mandating a full and fair procedure. According to the state's
argument, any sentence must be constitutionally acceptable, regardless of how unfair the
procedure or how minimal or nonexistent the hearing, because the sentence is presumed
to be fair. No such presumption saves the unfair and unconstitutional sentencing

11

The PSR also contains three remote arrests in the early 1970's. PSR at 4.
Without a disposition showing a conviction, these charges could not properly be
considered to increase the sentence. In addition, the passage of a significant amount of
time-close to thirty years-made these remote arrests of no significance to the sentencing
decision.
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procedure utilized in this case.
Moreover, any presumption of regularity which may attach has been more than
overcome. The only information considered in open court was Wanosik's absence. The
judge did not afford counsel the opportunity to address sentencing factors and instead
concluded that Wanosik was voluntarily absent then proceeded to immediately sentence
him to the maximum term. Even if a presumption of regularity did attach to sentencing
proceedings, that presumption was more than overcome by the procedure utilized at
sentencing in this case.12
In this case where the trial court failed to conduct a full and fair sentencing
hearing and failed to impose sentence based on relevant and reliable information, the
sentence was properly vacated and the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
Moreover, even if a harmless error review were required, harm is evident in this case
where the PSR recommended twenty days jail. Had the judge based the sentence in this

12

The state has not argued on certiorari review that absence alone is sufficient to
impose the statutory maximum sentence. This probably is the case because it is clear that
the sentence must be based on more than the single factor of absence. See McClendon,
611 P.2d at 729 ("A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant
in light of his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society
which underlie the criminal justice system.M). Moreover, common sense dictates that
imposing a maximum sentence based solely on a failure to appear can result in sentences
which are not appropriate in light of society's interest, the nature of the crime, or the
defendant's background and which impact profoundly on criminal justice resources.
While ramifications for failing to appear such as being picked up on a warrant and
having to spend several days in jail while waiting to see a judge should and do exist,
scarce bed space at jails is not best utilized when the defendant's background and crime
do not warrant the maximum sentence.
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case on relevant and reliable factors, the outcome would have been different.
CONCLUSION
Respondent Anthony Wanosik respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / t £ day of July, 2002.
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ADDENDUM A

Page 1
31 P.3d615
428 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2001 UT App 241
(Cite as: 31 P.3d 615)
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Anthony James WANOSIK, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20000541-CA.
Aug. 16,2001.

Defendant who pleaded guilty to drug charges in the
District Court, Salt Lake Department, J. Dennis
Frederick, J., and was sentenced in absentia. Defendant
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that:
(1) defendant was not entitled to explicit warning that,
even if defendant were absent, the court might proceed
with sentencing; (2) sentencing court was required to
inquire into defendant's ability to appear at sentencing
proceeding, and State was required to make preliminary
showing of voluntariness of defendant's absence,
before sentencing court could decide that defendant
had waived his right to be present; (3) sentencing
court's failure to properly inquire into whether
defendant's absence at sentencing hearing was
voluntary was harmless error; and (4) sentencing
court's failure to hear evidence from prosecutor and
defense counsel at sentencing hearing was not harmless
error.
Vacated and remanded.

West Headnotes
[1] Sentencing and Punishment €==>341
350Hk341 Most Cited Cases

Defendant's right to be present at all proceedings may
be waived by defendant's voluntary absence from
sentencing; this waiver must be voluntary and involve
an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Rules
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[4] Sentencing and Punishment C=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
Defendant was not entitled to explicit warning that,
even if defendant were absent, the trial court might
proceed with sentencing, and thus defendant's
voluntary absence from sentencing proceeding after he
pleaded guilty did not bar trial court from pronouncing
sentence. Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[5] Sentencing and Punishment C=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
To require an explicit warning that sentencing will
proceed even in the defendant's voluntary absence is to
conclude that, without such a warning, defendants will
assume they have the right to avoid sentencing simply
by refusing to appear. Rules Crim.Proc, Rules
17(a)(2), 22(b).
[6] Criminal Law €=>636(2)
110k636(2) Most Cited Cases
Notice of the proceeding is alone sufficient to allow a
defendant to exercise the right to be present by
appearing, or to waive that right through voluntary
absence. Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[7] Criminal Law €==>636(2)
110k636(2) Most Cited Cases

A criminal defendant's right to be present at all stages
of trial includes the right to be present at sentencing.

A defendant need not be warned that the proceedings
may go forward in his absence in order to deem
voluntary absence a knowing waiver of the right to be
present. Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).

[2] Criminal Law €=>636(1)
110k636(l) Most Cited Cases

[8] Sentencing and Punishment C=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases

To intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the
defendant must have notice of the proceedings. Rules
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).

Sentencing court was not required to conduct analysis
as to whether the public interest in proceeding with
sentencing clearly outweighed the interest of the
voluntarily absent defendant in attending the
proceeding; neither federal rules nor federal
constitution required such a balancing test. Rules

[3] Sentencing and Punishment ©^345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
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Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).

proceeding. Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).

[9] Criminal Law €==>636(2)
110k636(2) Most Cited Cases

[15] Criminal Law €=>636(2)
110k636(2) Most Cited Cases

The fact that a defendant was informed of the time and
place of the proceeding allows a court to presume that
a defendant's absence therefrom is knowing, i.e., that
the defendant knows he is missing the proceeding; the
fact that an absent defendant had notice of the
proceeding does not, however, allow a presumption
that absence therefrom is voluntary. Rules Crim.Proc,
Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).

A defendant must have a compelling reason to stay
away from the trial; if his absence is deliberate without
a sound reason, the trial may start in his absence. Rules
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).

[10] Criminal Law €=>636(2)
110k636(2) Most Cited Cases
A trial court may not assume a defendant's knowing
absence is voluntary, but rather is required to determine
whether a defendant's absence is in fact voluntary.
Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[11] Sentencing and Punishment €==>345
3 50Hk345 Most Cited Cases
Sentencing court was required to inquire into
defendant's ability to appear at sentencing proceeding,
and State was required to make a preliminary showing
of the voluntariness of defendant's absence, before
sentencing court could decide that defendant had
waived his right to be present at sentencing. Rules
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[12] Sentencing and Punishment C=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
The voluntariness of defendant's absence from
sentencing proceeding may not be presumed by the trial
court; rather, an inquiry into the defendant's ability to
appear at the proceeding is required. Rules Crim.Proc,
Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[13] Sentencing and Punishment €=^>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
The voluntariness of defendant's absence from
sentencing proceeding is determined by considering the
totality of the circumstances. Rules Crim.Proc, Rules
17(a)(2), 22(b).
[14] Sentencing and Punishment C=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
The state carries the burden of showing the
voluntariness of defendant's absence from sentencing

[16] Sentencing and Punishment €=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
When defendant is absent from sentencing
proceedings, the State must make a preliminary
showing, based on reasonable inquiry, that defendant's
absence is voluntary; except as otherwise required by
the attorney-client privilege, defense counsel has an
obligation to aid the State by being forthcoming with
any information defense counsel may have that could
be helpful in determining the defendant's whereabouts
or reasons for the defendant's absence.
Rules
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[17] Sentencing and Punishment C=>341
350Hk341 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 350Hk582, 110k582)
When neither court nor counsel have information as to
why the defendant is not present at sentencing, a
continuance will ordinarily be required to allow the
prosecution and defense counsel an opportunity to
inquire into the defendant's whereabouts and the
reasons for his absence. Rules Crim.Proc, Rules
17(a)(2), 22(b).
[18] Sentencing and Punishment €=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
Some avenues for establishing voluntariness of
defendant's absence at sentencing proceeding are: (1)
inquiry of law enforcement agencies to determine
whether defendant is incarcerated; (2) inquiry of local
hospitals as to whether defendant is admitted to one of
them; (3) inquiry of defendant's employer, if employer
can be readily determined, as to employer's knowledge
of defendant's whereabouts; (4) a reasonably diligent
attempt to contact defendant at his residence or other
place counsel knows defendant to frequent; (5) inquiry
of Pretrial Services or other entity supervising
defendant's presentence release; and (6) inquiry of any
bail bond company or other person or entity posting
bond to secure defendant's appearance.
Rules
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
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[19] Sentencing and Punishment C=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 110k345)
Once inquiry appropriate to the case has been made,
and a compelling reason for the defendant's absence at
sentencing proceeding remains unknown,
voluntariness, while not guarantied, may then be
properly inferred; however, defense counsel must then
have the opportunity to rebut the inference of
voluntariness. Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[20] Criminal Law €=>1166.14
1 lOkl 166.14 Most Cited Cases
A trial court's error in failing to conduct an adequate
inquiry into whether a defendant's absence was
voluntary does not merit reversal unless the defendant
was prejudiced by the lack of adequate inquiry. Rules
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[21] Criminal Law €==>1177
HOkl 177 Most Cited Cases
Sentencing court's failure to properly inquire into
whether defendant's absence at sentencing hearing was
voluntary was harmless error, where defendant, after
being apprehended, sent letter to sentencing court
stating that defendant did "not have a legitimate
excuse" for appearing for sentencing.
Rules
Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[22] Sentencing and Punishment €=>345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
[22] Sentencing and Punishment C==^360
350Hk360 Most Cited Cases
Defendant, by his voluntary absence at sentencing
proceeding, waived the right to personally make a
statement at sentencing and to personally present
information in mitigation of punishment or to show
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed;
however, sentencing court was required to afford the
defendant the opportunity to exercise his allocution
rights through counsel. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(a).
[23] Sentencing and Punishment C=>356
350Hk356 Most Cited Cases
A defendant's personal exercise of the rights granted in
the rule of criminal procedure which allows defendant
to make a statement at sentencing is referred to as
"allocution." Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(a).

[24] Sentencing and Punishment €>=>360
350Hk360 Most Cited Cases
Allocution is an inseparable part of the right to be
present at sentencing, which a defendant waives by his
voluntary absence. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(a).
[25] Sentencing and Punishment €=>360
350Hk360 Most Cited Cases
A defendant does not altogether waive his allocution
rights through voluntary absence at sentencing; he
waives only the right to personally exercise them. Rules
Crim.Proc, Rule 22(a).
[26] Criminal Law €=^641.13(7)
110k641.13(7) Most Cited Cases
Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding
at which a defendant is entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel, and the right to effective
assistance of counsel cannot be waived through
voluntary absence alone. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6;
Rules Crim.Proc, Rules 17(a)(2), 22(b).
[27] Sentencing and Punishment C=^345
350Hk345 Most Cited Cases
Even when defendant is voluntarily absent from
sentencing, and thereby waives his right to allocution,
trial court is required to afford defense counsel
opportunity to make statement in mitigation of sentence
and to give prosecutor opportunity to present
information relevant to sentencing. Rules Crim.Proc,
Rule 22(a).
[28] Criminal Law €=>H77
110k 1177 Most Cited Cases
Sentencing court's failure to hear evidence from
prosecutor and defense counsel at sentencing hearing
was not harmless error, even though defendant
voluntarily failed to appear at sentencing; defense
counsel had to be given an opportunity to present
information in mitigation of punishment and prosecutor
had to be given an opportunity to present information
relevant to sentencing. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(a).
[29] Constitutional Law €=>270(2)
92k270(2) Most Cited Cases
The state due process clause requires that a sentencing
judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant
information in exercising discretion in fixing a
sentence. Const. Art. 1, § 7.
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[30] Sentencing and Punishment O=*40
3 50Hk40 Most Cited Cases
[30] Sentencing and Punishment C==>66
350Hk66 Most Cited Cases
[30] Sentencing and Punishment €=>90
350Hk90 Most Cited Cases
A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for
the defendant in light of his background and the crime
committed and also serve the interests of society which
underlie the criminal justice system. Const. Art. 1, § 7.
[31] Constitutional Law €=>270(2)
92k270(2) Most Cited Cases
[31] Sentencing and Punishment €=>94
350Hk94 Most Cited Cases
Defendant's state due process rights were violated by
sentencing court's failure to base its sentencing
decision on relevant and reliable information regarding
the crime, defendant's background, and the interests of
society, and basing the court's decision solely on
defendant's voluntary absence at sentencing. Const.
Art. 1, § 7.
[32] Criminal Law €=>! 177
HOkl 177 Most Cited Cases
Sentencing court's failure to base its sentencing
decision on relevant and reliable information regarding
the crime, defendant's background, and the interests of
society, and basing the court's decision instead solely
on defendant's voluntary absence at sentencing, was not
harmless error. Const. Art. 1, § 7.
*618 Joan C. Watt, Catherine E. Lilly, and Andrea J.
Garland, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
*619 Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and Jeanne
B. Inouye, Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee.

Before JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge, ORME
and THORNE, Judges.
OPINION
ORME, Judge:
| 1 Defendant Anthony James Wanosik appeals the
sentences imposed by the trial court pursuant to his

guilty pleas to attempted unlawful possession or use of
a controlled substance and unlawful possession or use
of a controlled substance, class A and B misdemeanors,
respectively, each in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp.2000).
We vacate the
sentences and remand for resentencing.

BACKGROUND
K 2 The facts are undisputed. Wanosik pled guilty to
two misdemeanor drug offenses. At the plea hearing,
the trial court told Wanosik that sentencing would be
held on May 26, 2000, at 8:30 a.m., and ordered
Wanosik to report to Adult Probation and Parole (AP
& P) for preparation of a presentence report. The trial
court did not specifically inform Wanosik that he could
be sentenced in absentia if he failed to appear for
sentencing.
K 3 Wanosik reported to AP & P, and a presentence
report was completed. AP & P recommended that
Wanosik be sentenced to twenty days in jail with credit
for time served and that he then be committed to a
substance abuse treatment program.
f 4 A sentencing hearing was held as scheduled on
May 26, 2000. Wanosik was represented at the
hearing by counsel but did not appear personally at the
hearing or at any other time that morning.
% 5 Defense counsel expressed to the court her belief
that Wanosik had intended to appear for sentencing but
had perhaps written down the wrong date. Defense
counsel asked the court to wait before issuing an arrest
warrant to give counsel time to locate Wanosik. The
court denied defense counsel's request and proceeded
to impose sentence:
[G]iven [Wanosik's] failure to appear I will terminate
his pre-trial release, issue a warrant for his arrest
returnable forthwith no bail. My inclination is to
sentence him today, and I recognize you would
prefer that I did not, but I am inclined to do so. It is
curious that he has failed to appear today, although
I can only assume because he has not been in touch
with you nor has he been in touch with my court that
he has chosen to voluntarily absent himself from
these proceedings.
Consequently, it is the judgment and sentence of this
Court that he serve the term provided by law in the
adult detention center of one year for the class A
misdemeanor crime of attempted possession of a
controlled substance, and six months for the
possession of a controlled substance, a misdemeanor
charge to which he has pled guilty. I will order that
those terms be served concurrently and not
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consecutively, and that they be imposed forthwith.
Ms. Garland, in the event he is in touch with you or
shows up before he's arrested, then you may
approach me, but in the meantime, Mr. D'Alesandro,
you prepare the findings of fact, conclusions of law
and order determining voluntary absent compliance,
and that will be the order.
Defense counsel promptly objected:
MS. GARLAND: Judge, I would object to that order
because I don't think that it takes into account his due
process rights or his rights about-THE COURT: Right.
MS. GARLAND: However, I realize that's your
order.
THE COURT: Your objection is noted. I'll grant
him credit for the eight days he served awaiting
imposition or a resolution.
The hearing was then immediately concluded. The
prosecutor, Mr. D'Alesandro, was present but made no
statement during the sentencing hearing, and the court
addressed the prosecutor only to direct him to prepare
the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
f 6 On June 14,2000, Wanosik, through counsel, filed
a timely notice of appeal of the sentences imposed in
his absence. Wanosik was arrested a few months later
on the warrant issued at the sentencing. After his
arrest, *620 Wanosik sent a brief handwritten letter to
the trial court in which he forthrightly acknowledged,
with his own emphasis: "I do not have a legitimate
excuse" for being absent at sentencing.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
f 7 Wanosik makes two general claims on appeal: (1)
that sentencing should not have proceeded in his
absence; and (2) that even if sentencing him in
absentia was proper, the trial court erred by the manner
in which it conducted sentencing.
f 8 Under Wanosik's first general claim, i.e., that
sentencing should not have proceeded in his absence,
we address several distinct issues. First, we address
Wanosik's contention that, as a matter of law, a
defendant's absence at sentencing cannot be deemed
voluntary if the defendant was not warned that
sentencing could proceed in his voluntary absence.
This contention presents a purely legal question, which
we review for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
Second, we address
Wanosik's argument that even if a defendant's ibsence
is properly deemed voluntary, the trial court may not
proceed with sentencing without first balancing
society's interest in proceeding and the defendant's
interest in being present. This argument also presents

a question of law, which we review for correctness.
See id. Third, we believe that sound analysis requires
us to address whether, in this case, the trial court's
inquiry regarding the voluntariness of Wanosik's
absence was properly conducted. Specifically, we
address the questions of what type of inquiry is
required of the trial court in making the factual
determination of voluntariness; who has the burden of
proving voluntariness; and what type of evidence may
suffice to meet that burden.
These are all legal
questions, which, again, we review for correctness.
See id. Finally, we conclude this first section of the
opinion by considering whether any error by the trial
court was harmless.
f 9 Wanosik's second claim is that, even assuming
proceeding with sentencing in his absence was
appropriate, "[t]he trial court violated due process and
Utah R.Crim. P. 22[ (a) ] when it sentenced [Wanosik]
without considering relevant and reliable information
and without affording defense counsel or the
prosecutor the opportunity to speak at sentencing."
These assertions require us to interpret both the
mandates of Rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the requirements of Due Process at
sentencing. Each of these inquiries pose questions of
law, which we review for correctness, granting no
particular deference to the conclusions of the trial
court. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, f 15, 16
P.3d 540 ("[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure
is a question of law that we review for correctness.");
State v. Valencia,200\ UT App 159, f 9, 27 P.3d 573
("Issues of constitutional interpretation are questions of
law, which we review for correctness.").
I. Sentencing in Absentia
D][2][3] 1 10 We begin by addressing Wanosik's
claim that the trial court erred by sentencing him in his
absence. A criminal defendant's right to be present at
all stages of trial includes the right to be present at
sentencing. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,
1109-11 (Utah 1996). "To intentionally relinquish the
right to be present, the defendant must have notice of
the proceedings." Id at 1110. See Utah R.Crim. P.
17(a)(2), 22(b). "However, this right may be waived...
[by] the [defendant's] voluntary absence from
[sentencing]. This waiver must be voluntary and
involve an intentional relinquishment of a known
right." State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 989-90 (Utah
Ct.App.1989) (citations omitted). [FN1]

FN 1. Wagstaffinvolved a defendant's absence
from trial rather than from sentencing. See
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772 P.2d at 988-89. The Utah Supreme
Court, however, has previously relied on both
Wagstaff and State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677
(Utah 1986) (per curiam), another Utah case
involving a defendant's absence at trial, in
addressing a criminal defendant's right to be
present at sentencing. See State v. Anderson,
929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996) (citing
Wagstaff, m?2d<it990\ Houtz,! UP 2d at
678). Likewise, the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure treat identically a defendant's right
to be present at trial and a defendant's right to
be present at sentencing. See Utah R.Crim.
P. 22(b). We therefore see no basis on which
to distinguish between trial and sentencing in
our analysis of a defendant's right to be
present and a defendant's voluntary waiver of
that right.
*621 A. Specific Warning of Consequences
[4] f 11 Notwithstanding that the Utah case law and
rules referred to above appear to require only notice to
defendant of the proceedings and of the right to be
present in order to permit the court to proceed to a
determination whether a defendant's voluntary absence
is a waiver of the right to be present, Wanosik argues
that a further warning is required.
Specifically,
Wanosik argues he was entitled to be warned that the
court might proceed with sentencing if he were to be
voluntarily absent. [FN2] We disagree.

FN2. Wanosik references both the Utah
Constitution and the United States
Constitution as well as the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure in making this argument.
However,
[n]o argument has been made as to why, if we
were to uphold the [sentencing] under the
Utah [Rules of Criminal Procedure], the result
would be different under either the Utah or
the federal constitution. We will therefore
treat the contention as a single argument with
three legal bases rather than as three separate
arguments.
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 n. 3
(Utah 1996).
[5][6] 1f 12 To require an explicit warning that
sentencing will proceed even in the defendant's
voluntary absence is to conclude that, without such a
warning, defendants will assume they have the right to

avoid sentencing simply by refusing to appear. See
Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17,20,94 S.Ct. 194,
196, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (per curiam). It is
inimical to the common respect due our governmental
institutions for us to indulge in the presumption that
persons will assume they have the right to impede the
judicial system by deliberately absenting themselves
from criminal proceedings to which they are a party.
See id. ("It seems ... incredible to us ... 'that a
defendant who flees from a courtroom in the midst of
a trial-where judge, jury, witnesses, and lawyers are
present and ready to continue-would not know that as
a consequence the trial could continue in his absence.'
" (citation omitted)). [FN3] "The right at issue is the
right to be present." Id. Notice of the proceeding is
alone sufficient to allow a defendant to exercise the
right to be present by appearing, or to waive that right
through voluntary absence. See id. Whether it be trial
or sentencing, we must presume defendants fully
understand that important proceedings will go forward
without them in the event of their voluntary absence.
[FN4] Thus, there is no need to specially warn
defendants of this obvious fact.
FN3. We acknowledge that a defendant who
flees in the midst of a trial may have more
reason to know that the proceedings will
move forward in his absence than a defendant
who absents himself from sentencing after
entering a guilty plea. We nevertheless
remain unpersuaded that a warning is required
to disabuse defendants of the belief that they
may prevent their own sentencing through
deliberate absence from the sentencing
proceeding. We therefore, again, do not
distinguish between the right to be present at
trial from the right to be present at sentencing,
in terms of what type of notice is required to
deem a defendant's voluntary absence a
knowing waiver of the right to be present.
See note 1.

FN4. Nor is this some unique feature of the
judicial system that will be foreign to the
average citizen. Whether one is a season
ticket holder or a team member, a scheduled
basketball game will go forward whether or
not he or she shows up. If one does not
appear for a scheduled dental or medical
appointment, he or she should expect to be
billed anyway. If one misses an employment
interview without prior explanation, he or she
knows the job will go to someone else.
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While the uniqueness of judicial business
makes these examples less than perfect, the
expectation in contemporary American society
is that one should appear at duly scheduled
events or be willing to accept the
ramifications of his or her voluntary absence.
In most social and commercial arenas, an
expectation of unexcused absence without
consequence is not the order of the day.

113 Wanosik observes that although neither Wagstqff
nor Anderson addresses whether a specific warning is
required, such a requirement would not be inconsistent
with the holdings of those cases. However, the only
federal case Wanosik cites directly supporting his
proposition that a specific warning is required to
inform defendants that sentencing may proceed in their
voluntary absence is United States v. McPherson, 421
F.2d 1127 (D.C.Cir.1969), which held that such a
warning is required. See id. at 1129-30. The United
States Supreme Court has, however, explicitly rejected
McPherson 's holding requiring such a warning. See
Taylor, 414 U.S. at 20 n. 3,94 S.Ct. at 196 n. 3 ("[T]he
Court of Appeals ... disagreed with *622 McPherson,
and, in our view, rightly so."). [FN5] Nonetheless,
Wanosik maintains that McPherson's holding is good
law and cites the more recent United States Supreme
Court case, Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255,113
S.Ct. 748, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993), as "further support
for the McPherson requirement." Crosby, however,
does not undermine Taylor 's rejection of McPherson
' s warning requirement.

FN5. Wanosik observes that the Utah
Supreme Court has cited McPherson with
approval. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d
1107, 1110 (Utah 1996). However, the Utah
Supreme Court's reliance on McPherson
extended only to the proposition that "[t]o
intentionally relinquish the right to be present,
the defendant must have notice of the
proceedings." Id. Nowhere does Anderson
intimate that any further warning is required.
Indeed, Anderson implicitly rejects the notion
that a further warning is required by affirming
the sentencing, in absentia, of a defendant
who, although he waived in writing his right
to be present at trial, was not explicitly
warned that sentencing would proceed in his
voluntary absence. See id. at 1110-11.

114 Crosby interprets Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure and holds that, under the explicit
language of that rule, a court may never commence trial
in a defendant's absence. [FN6] See 506 U.S. at
258-62, 113 S.Ct. at 751-53. The Crosby Court also
observes, however, that under Rule 43 a defendant's
absence after trial has commenced will automatically
be deemed a knowing waiver of the right to be present,
even without prior warning to the defendant regarding
the consequences of voluntary absence. See 506 U.S.
at 261-62,113 S.Ct. at 752. Thus, like Taylor, Crosby
concludes that in circumstances where the federal rules
otherwise allow for trial in absentia, a warning is not
required to inform defendants that voluntary absence
will likely result in trial in absentia. See Crosby, 506
U.S. at 261-62, 113 S.Ct. at 752; Taylor, 414 U.S. at
20, 94 S.Ct. at 196.

FN6. Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure states in relevant part:
(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall
be present at the arraignment, at the time of
the plea, at every stage of the trial including
the impaneling of the jury and the return of
the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence,
except as otherwise provided by this rule, (b)
Continued Presence Not Required.
The
further progress of the trial to and including
the return of the verdict shall not be prevented
and the defendant shall be considered to have
waived the right to be present whenever a
defendant, initially present,
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has
commenced (whether or not the defendant has
been informed by the court of the obligation
to remain during the trial)[.]

[7] | 15 Significantly, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
differ in an important respect highlighted by Crosby.
Federal Rule 43 treats differently absence at the
commencement of trial from absence after the
commencement of trial.
See Fed.R.Crim.P. 43;
Crosby, 506 U.S. at 258-62, 113 S.Ct. at 751-53. The
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure draw no such
distinction, but rather treat a defendant's absence at any
stage of criminal proceedings similarly to the federal
rule's treatment of a defendant's absence after
commencement of trial. [FN7] Compare Utah R.Crim.
P. 17(a)(2), 22(b) with Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a) & (b)(1).
Thus, for our purposes, the significance of Crosby is
that it affirms the United States Supreme Court's view
that a warning of the consequences of voluntary
absence is not required to deem a defendant's absence
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after commencement of trial voluntary. Our holding,
therefore, accords with that of the United States
Supreme Court when we conclude that a defendant
need not be warned that the proceedings may go
forward in his absence in order to deem voluntary
absence a knowing waiver of the right to be present.
Thus, although at least one state mandates a warning
like that required in McPherson, see People v. Link,
291 IU.App.3d 1064,226 Ill.Dec. 369,685 N.E.2d 624,
626 (1997), we, with the United States Supreme Court,
decline to adopt McPherson's holding.

FN7. Rule 17(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure states:
In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by
death, the defendant's voluntary absence from
the trial after notice to defendant of the time
for trial shall not prevent the case from being
tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein
shall have the same effect as if defendant had
been present....
Furthermore, Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 22(b) states: "On the same grounds
that a defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced
in defendant's absence."

*623 f 16 Wanosik was given notice of the date and
time of his sentencing. He had the right to appear if he
chose; he had no right to assume the matter could be
taken care of some other time, when he felt more in the
mood to attend. We see no error in the trial court's
failure to specifically warn Wanosik that sentencing
would proceed in the event of his voluntary absence
from the proceeding.
B. Balancing of Interests
[8] | 17 Relying on two in a line of cases from the
Second Circuit, Wanosik argues that even if a
defendant's absence is properly deemed knowing and
voluntary, a trial court may not proceed unless "the
public interest in proceeding clearly outweighs the
interest of the voluntarily absent defendant in
attending." Smith v. Mann, 173 F.3d73,76(2ndCir.),
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 884,120 S.Ct. 200,145 L.Ed.2d
168 (1999). See United States v. Fontanel, 878 F.2d
33,37(2ndCir.l989).
\ 18 The Second Circuit acknowledges "that while [it
believes] prudential concerns animate the need for a
balancing of interests before a district court exercises
its discretion to conduct a trial in absentia, all that the

Constitution requires is a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the right to be present at trial." Mann, 173
F.3d at 76 (emphasis added). Accord Clark v. Scott,
70 F.3d 386, 389-90 (5th Cir.1995), cert, denied, 528
U.S. 884,120 S.Ct. 200,145 L.Ed.2d 168 (1999). The
Second Circuit has thus, out of "prudential concerns,"
hedged their trial courts' discretion to proceed in a
defendant's absence by imposing a judicially created
balancing test not required by either the federal rules or
the United States Constitution.
We decline the
invitation to adopt a similar balancing test in Utah.
When a defendant's absence from a criminal
proceeding is properly deemed knowing and voluntary,
the trial court may proceed without further inquiry or
analysis. Therefore, it was not error for the trial court
in this case to fail to balance the public interest in
proceeding against Wanosik's interest in being present.
C. Voluntariness Inquiry
[9] [ 10] [ 11 ] f 19 We haveconcluded that a trial court is
not required to warn a defendant that trial or
sentencing may proceed in the defendant's voluntary
absence. We have also concluded that a trial court is
not required to balance the public interest in resolving
the matter against the defendant's interest in being
present before proceeding in a defendant's voluntary
absence. However, a trial court may not assume a
defendant's knowing absence is voluntary, but rather is
required to determine whether a defendant's absence is
in fact voluntary. [FN8] See State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d
677, 678 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). We therefore
review whether the trial court in this case properly
concluded that Wanosik's absence at sentencing was
actually voluntary.

FN8. The fact that a defendant was informed
of the time and place of the proceeding allows
a court to presume that a defendant's absence
therefrom is knowing, i.e., that the defendant
knows he is missing the proceeding. The fact
that an absent defendant had notice of the
proceeding does not, however, allow a
presumption that absence therefrom is
voluntary. See Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678.
After all, such a defendant may be
incarcerated on another charge or comatose in
a hospital.

K 20 The sum of the trial court's oral findings and
analysis on the voluntariness of Wanosik's absence at
sentencing is the following: [FN9] "I can only assume
because he has not been in touch with [defense
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counsel] nor has he been in touch with my court that he
has chosen to voluntarily absent himself from these
proceedings." We do not question the underlying
findings of the trial court, i.e., that Wanosik had not
been in touch with counsel or the court.
These
findings, however, suggest nothing more than that no
one knew why Wanosik was absent. With no reliable
information on the voluntariness of Wanosik's absence,
the trial court merely assumed that Wanosik's absence
was voluntary. [FN 10]

FN9. The trial court's written findings and
conclusions do not substantively differ from
what the court stated orally at the hearing.

FN 10. As hereafter more fully explained, case
law rejects the legitimacy of such an
assumption, but it is not intrinsically an
unreasonable one. Statistically, the vast
majority of court no-shows spaced it out,
could not muster the courage or effort to be
present, or got sidetracked in some volitional
way. Only a tiny minority find themselves
comatose or otherwise involuntarily
incapacitated at the time of trial or sentencing.
Even those who are incarcerated, assuming it
is in this state, usually have the means to let
their circumstances be known. Cf In re A.E.,
2001 UT App 202, J 5,29 P.3d 31 ("Father...
was not transported from the jail for the trial
because he did not inform jail officials of the
trial dates.").

*624[12][13][14][15H21 "[Voluntariness may not
be presumed by the trial court." Houtz, 714 P.2d at
678. Rather, an inquiry into the defendant's ability to
appear at the proceeding is required. See id. We have
not previously detailed the type of inquiry required to
determine if a defendant's absence is voluntary. We
have, however, outlined some general principles:
Voluntariness is determined by considering the
totality of the circumstances. The state carries the
burden of showing voluntariness. A defendant must
have a compelling reason to stay away from the trial.
If his absence is deliberate without a sound reason,
the trial may start in his absence.
State v. Wagstajf, 772 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah
Ct.App.1989) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
This case presents an opportunity to
elaborate on these general principles.
[16][17] Tf 22 In such circumstances, the State must

make a preliminary showing, based on reasonable
inquiry, that defendant's absence is voluntary. Except
as otherwise required by the attorney-client privilege,
defense counsel has an obligation to aid thu tate by
being forthcoming with any information aefense
counsel may have that could be helpful in determining
the defendant's whereabouts or reasons for the
defendant's absence. When neither court nor counsel
have information as to why the defendant is not
present, a continuance will ordinarily be required to
allow the prosecution and defense counsel an
opportunity to inquire into the defendant's whereabouts
and the reasons for his absence.
[18][19] f 23 Ascertaining whether a defendant's
absence is voluntary will often be difficult if the
defendant is simply a no-show. While we need not in
this case definitively prescribe what the State must do
to meet its preliminary burden, and while the showing
it must make will vary with the facts and circumstances
of particular cases, some avenues for establishing
voluntariness are: (1) inquiry of law enforcement
agencies to determine whether the defendant is
incarcerated, see Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678 ("When a
defendant is in custody, he is not free to make a
voluntary decision about whether or not he will attend
the court proceedings."); (2) inquiry of local hospitals
as to whether the defendant has been admitted to one of
them, cf State v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641, 642 (Utah 1982)
(per curiam) ("Trial proceeded for four days, when on
the fifth day, defendant failed to appear. He was
found in a Salt Lake City hospital suffering from a
heart attack, diagnosed as minor. His doctor contacted
the court and recommended a one-month
continuance.");
(3) inquiry of the defendant's
employer, if the employer can be readily determined, as
to the employer's possible knowledge of the defendant's
whereabouts; (4) a reasonably diligent attempt to
contact defendant at his residence or other place
counsel knows the defendant to frequent; (5) inquiry
of Pretrial Services or other entity supervising
defendant's presentence release; and (6) inquiry of any
bail bond company or other person or entity posting
bond to secure defendant's appearance. Once inquiry
appropriate to the case has been made, and a
compelling reason for the defendant's absence remains
unknown, voluntariness, while not guarantied, may
then be properly inferred.
If 24 Defense counsel, however, must then have the
opportunity to rebut the inference of voluntariness.
Defense counsel may by that time have gathered
additional information regarding the defendant's
whereabouts and may, for example, be able to contend
that although no local hospital shows the defendant as
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currently registered, his roommate says he took him to
the emergency room the previous evening, suggesting
the possible involuntariness of the defendant's absence
at a proceeding early the next morning.
1f 25 In this case, the State made no preliminary
showing of voluntariness whatever, and the trial court
erred by making "inadequate inquiry into [Wanosik's]
ability to appear *625 on [May 26, 2000] or his
subsequent availability before deciding that he had
waived his right to be present at [sentencing]." Houtz,
714P.2dat678.
D. Harmless Error
[20][21] If 26 A trial court's error in failing to conduct
an adequate inquiry into whether a defendant's absence
was voluntary does not merit reversal, however, unless
the defendant was prejudiced by the lack of adequate
inquiry. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,
1111-12 (Utah 1996) ("It stands to reason that a
defendant cannot demand repetition of a trial or
sentencing in which he suffered no unfairness.").
When finally apprehended, Wanosik sent a letter to the
trial court candidly acknowledging: "I do not have a
legitimate excuse" for not appearing for sentencing.
Based on Wanosik's subsequent concession of actual
voluntary absence at sentencing, we conclude that
Wanosik suffered no prejudice by the trial court's
failure to make adequate inquiry into whether his
absence was voluntary. Accordingly, the court's error
in proceeding to impose sentence was, in this case,
harmless.
II. Sentencing Procedure
f 27 Wanosik argues that, even if proceeding with
sentencing in his absence was appropriate, "[t]he trial
court violated due process and Utah R.Crim. P. 22 [ (a)
] when it sentenced [him] without considering relevant
and reliable information and without affording defense
counsel or the prosecutor the opportunity to speak at
sentencing."
A. Rule 22(a)
[22] f 28 We first address Wanosik's claim that the
trial court violated rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. [FN11] The second paragraph of
rule 22(a) states:

FN11. The State asserts that Wanosik must
show plain error with regard to his rule 22(a)
claim on appeal because he did not preserve

the claim below. We observe "that rule 22(e)
[of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure]
permits the court of appeals to consider the
legality of a sentence even if the issue is
raised for the first time on appeal." State v.
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995). The
Brooks holding obviates the need for
appellants to show plain error in asserting on
appeal unpreserved claims that the sentence
imposed by the trial court was illegal. See id.
at 858-60.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to
present any information in mitigation of punishment,
or to show any legal cause why sentence should not
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be
given an opportunity to present any information
material to the imposition of sentence.
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a). Initially, we must determine
whether Wanosik waived his rights under rule 22(a) by
voluntarily absenting himself from the sentencing
proceeding.
[23][24] t 29 A defendant's personal exercise of the
rights granted in rule 22(a) is referred to as allocution.
See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110-12 (Utah
1996); State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d
297,299 (1969), vacated and remanded, 408 U.S. 935,
92 S.Ct. 2858, 33 L.Ed.2d 751 (1972). "[Allocution]
is an inseparable part of the right to be present, which
[a] defendant waive[s] by his voluntary absence."
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. Wanosik, therefore, by
his voluntary absence, waived the right to personally
make a statement at sentencing and to personally
present information in mitigation of punishment or to
show legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
See id.
[25][26][27] | 30 A defendant does not, however,
altogether waive his rule 22(a) rights through voluntary
absence at sentencing; he waives only the right to
personally exercise them. "Sentencing is a critical
stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is
entitled to the effective assistance of counsel," State v.
Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982), and the
right to effective assistance of counsel cannot be
waived through voluntary absence alone. See State v.
Bakalov, 1999UT45,f 16,979 P.2d 799 (holding that,
in order to waive the right to counsel and "invoke the
right of self-representation, a defendant must in a
timely manner ' "clearly and unequivocally" ' request
[self-representation]" (citations omitted)).
Furthermore, rule 22(a) unequivocally directs the *626
sentencing court to "give[ ] [the prosecuting attorney]
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an opportunity to present any information material to
the imposition of sentence." Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a).
It would be patently unfair, in the case of an absent
defendant, to hear only from the prosecuting attorney
and not from defense counsel regarding sentencing
considerations. Thus, we hold that a sentencing court
is required to afford a voluntarily absent defendant the
opportunity to exercise his rule 22(a) rights through
counsel.
f 31 At sentencing in this case, the trial court did hear
briefly from defense counsel on the issue of Wanosik's
absence concerning any "legal cause why sentence
should not [have been] imposed" at that time, Utah
R.Crim. P. 22(a); briefly addressed that issue as
discussed above; and then proceeded to impose
sentence. However, before proceeding with sentencing,
the trial court heard from neither defense counsel nor
the prosecutor with regard to "information in mitigation
of punishment" or "any [other] information material to
the imposition of sentence." Id. The State argues that
under rule 22(a) the burden rests on counsel to request
an opportunity to present information relevant to
sentencing. The State's argument is contrary to the plain
language of the rule and the construction given it in
case law.
| 32 The language of the rule is that "the court shall
afford the defendant an opportunity to make a
statement and to present any information in mitigation
of punishment." Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis
added).
Thus, the rule imposes an affirmative
obligation on the trial court to extend the opportunity to
be heard; it does not contemplate the court will
passively wait for counsel to make a request to be
heard. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has said
that rule 22(a) "directs trial courts to hear evidence
from both the defendant and the prosecution that is
relevant to the sentence to be imposed." State v.
Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985). [FN 12] This
directive is nowhere made conditional on a preliminary
request by counsel to present the information. Even if
a defendant is voluntarily absent, the trial court has the
duty to set its aggravation aside and impose a
reasonable sentence, and to that end the court is
required to hear evidence from both sides relevant to
sentencing. The onus is thus on the trial court to
"afford" the defendant and to "give" the prosecutor the
opportunity to present relevant information. [FN 13]
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a). The trial court in this case
erred by not affording defense counsel an opportunity
to present information in mitigation of punishment or
giving the prosecutor an opportunity to present
information relevant to sentencing.

FN 12. Howell actually interpreted the
predecessor of Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 22(a), Utah Code Ann. §
77-35-22(a 1982). See 707 P.2d at 118.
Current rule 22(a) differs from then-section
77-35-22(a) only in that rule 22(a) omits the
words "in his own behalf from section
77-35-22(a)'s sentence: "Before imposing
sentence the court shall afford the defendant
an opportunity to make a statement in his own
behalf and to present any information in
mitigation of punishment...." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-35-22(a) (1982) (emphasis added). See
also Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a). If anything,
deletion of the italicized phrase emphasizes
that while defendant is entitled to make a
statement, he need not personally make it.

FN 13. We [here] note that it is not just the
defendant, but the State as well, that has an
interest in the sentence being based on
accurate information. Decisions as to the
type of rehabilitation program, if any, to
which a defendant is assigned and the
duration of incarceration both influence the
allocation of scarce personnel and monetary
resources. Such decisions should be based
upon the most reliable data possible as to each
defendant so that this State may deal with its
criminal justice program as efficiently as
possible.
State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah
1982).

[28] ^ 33 Noncompliance with rule 22(a) in this case
was not harmless, as the State suggests. Had either
defense counsel or the prosecutor been given a chance
to address AP & P's recommendation that Wanosik be
sentenced to 20 days in jail with credit for time served
and that he then be committed to a substance abuse
treatment program, the sentencing outcome for
Wanosik may well have been more favorable than the
maximum sentences imposed by the trial court. Thus,
we vacate Wanosik's sentences and remand for
resentencing.
*627 B. Due Process Requirements at Sentencing
[29][30][31][32] f 34 Due Process considerations
underscore the propriety of our remand for
resentencing. "The due process clause of Article 1,
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a
sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and
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relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing
a sentence." State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah
1985). "A sentence in a criminal case should be
appropriate for the defendant in light of his background
and the crime committed and also serve the interests of
society which underlie the criminal justice system."
State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980).
"[T]he sentencing judge[ ][has] discretion in
determining what punishment fits both the crime and
the offender," but we have consistently sought "to
shore up the soundness and reliability of the factual
basis upon which the judge must rely in the exercise of
that sentencing discretion." State v.. Lipsky, 608 P.2d
1241, 1249 (Utah 1980) (requiring disclosure of
presentence report to defendant prior to sentencing).
Although rule 22(a) implements sound procedures
aimed at insuring that the trial court bases its
sentencing decision on such information, a criminal
defendant's right to be sentenced based on relevant and
reliable information regarding his crime, his
background, and the interests of society stands
independent of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a).
1f 35 The record in this case fails to disclose any
relevant or reliable information, other than the fact that
defendant was absent from the proceeding, relied on by
the trial court in imposing maximum-albeit
concurrent-sentences for both crimes. Voluntary
absence from sentencing may properly serve as one
factor in determining an appropriate sentence, as it is
an indirect-but telling-indication of the defendant's
suitability for probation or susceptibility to
rehabilitative efforts. It is not, however, sufficient to
rely upon that fact alone in deciding what sentence to
impose, nor may such absence be punished by
imposing a sentence more severe than is otherwise
warranted.
From all that appears in the record,
however, Wanosik's absence at sentencing was the only
information considered by the trial court in deciding
what sentences to impose.

Furthermore, a sentencing court need not balance
society's interest in proceeding against a voluntarily
absent defendant with the defendant's interest in being
present before proceeding with sentencing in absentia.
In this case, the trial court's only error in regard to
proceeding in absentia was its inadequate inquiry into
the actual voluntariness of Wanosik's absence. The
error was, however, harmless given Wanosik's later
concession that his absence was indeed voluntary.
1J38 Nonetheless, the trial court erred in not complying
with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) by failing
to afford defendant, through his counsel, an
opportunity to present information in mitigation of
punishment and by failing to also give the prosecutor
an opportunity to present information relevant to
sentencing.
This course was also at odds with
Wanosik's Due Process rights, as the court failed to
base its sentencing decision on relevant and reliable
information.
U 39 We vacate Wanosik's sentences and remand for
resentencing.

H 40 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON,
Associate Presiding Judge, WILLIAM A. THORNE,
Jr., Judge.
31 P.3d 615, 428 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2001 UT App
241
END OF DOCUMENT

% 36 Wanosik's Due Process rights were compromised
by the trial court's failure to base its sentencing
decision on relevant and reliable information regarding
the crime, Wanosik's background, and the interests of
society. For the same reasons noted in the preceding
section, the trial court's failure to base its sentencing
decision on relevant and reliable information was not
harmless.
CONCLUSION
1f 37 A defendant informed of the time and place for
sentencing need not be further informed that sentencing
may proceed in the defendant's voluntary absence.
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or pica of no contest., the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds t h a t a defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. Tf a
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a w a r r a n t for defendant's arrest may be
issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with
the c urt.
ie) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose
sentence in accordance with Title 77. Chapter 16a Utah ('ode. If the court
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department
of Human Sendees as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202( 1Kb), the court
shall so specify in the sentencing order.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 1, 1995; J a n u a r y 1, 1996.)

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I

Sec* 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec- 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
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(Electronically recorded on May 26, 2000)

3

THE COURT:

Your Honor, my last matter before you is

4

Anthony James Wanosik, and I've looked for him but I've not

5

been able to find himf your Honor.

6

sentence report.

7

THE COURT:

8

(No response)

9

THE COURT:

Is Anthony James Wanosik in the courtroom?

Yes, let's discuss that matter for a

10

moment.

11

appearing in his behalf?

12

He did obtain his pre-

This is case No. CR00-5943. Ms. Garland, you're

MS. GARLAND:

I am, your Honor.

I think given that he

13

did go and obtain his pre-sentence report he was intending to

14

show up today, and so I would ask that you hold on to any

15

warrants and give me a chance to find him.

16

have simply written down the wrong date.

17

THE COURT:

18

MS. GARLAND:

I believe he may

Well—
I believe that, Judge, because this is a

19

fairly favorable pre-sentence report, so he would have had no

20

reason to try and avoid court today, it would—

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. GARLAND:

23

interest to appear.

24

THE COURT:

25

Presumably.
Yes, it would have been in his best

I think in the meantime, counsel, given

his failure to appear I will terminate his pre-trial release,

-31

issue a warrant for his arrest returnable forthwith no bail.

2

My inclination is to sentence him today, and I recognize you

3

would prefer that I did not, but I am inclined to do so.

4

curious that he has failed to appear today, although I can only

5

assume because he has not been in touch with you nor has he

6

been in touch with my court that he has chosen to voluntarily

7

absent himself from these proceedings.

8
9

It is

Consequently, it is the judgment and sentence of this
Court that he serve the term provided by law in the adult

10

detention center of one year for the class A misdemeanor crime

11

of attempted possession of a controlled substance, and six

12

months for the possession of a controlled substance, a

13

misdemeanor charge to which he has pled guilty.

14

that those terms be served concurrently and not consecutively,

15

and that they be imposed forthwith.

16

I will order

Ms. Garland, in the event he is in touch with you or

17

shows up before he's arrested, then you may approach me, but in

18

the meantime, Mr. D'alesandro, you prepare the findings of fact

19

conclusions of law and order determining voluntary absent

20

compliance, and that will be the order.

21

MS. GARLAND:

Judge, I would object to that order

22

because I don't think that it takes into account his due

23

process rights or his rights about—

24

THE COURT: Right.

25

MS. GARLAND:

However, I realize that's your order.

-4THE COURT:

Your objection is noted.

I'll grant him

credit for the eight days he served originally awaiting
imposition or a resolution.
MS. GARLAND:
THE COURT:

All right.

All right, thank you, Ms. Garland.

(Hearing concluded)
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
PER CURIAM.
*1 Appellant Jon Donald Hamling appeals his
sentence imposed in absentia. Hamling pleaded guilty
to attempted possession of a controlled substance, a
class A misdemeanor. At the time of his plea, he was
given a sentencing hearing date of August 4,2001, and
told to contact Adult Probation and Parole for the
preparation of a presentence report. Hamling was also
ordered released pending sentencing. Hamling
participated in the preparation of the presentence report
and provided information to Adult Probation and
Parole.
Hamling did not appear at his sentencing hearing.
Defense counsel indicated that she had had contact
with him two weeks prior to the sentencing date, but
not since then. The court determined that, because
Hamling had not contacted the court and he was not at
the sentencing hearing, he had voluntarily absented
himself from the proceedings. The judge gave defense
counsel an opportunity to provide sentencing
information. Counsel spoke on Hamling's behalf and
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the judge then, without affording the prosecution an
opportunity to address sentencing, imposed a sentence
of one year of incarceration, the maximum penalty for
a class A misdemeanor. Defense counsel filed a motion
to correct an illegal sentence in the trial court, which
was denied, and this appeal followed.
In sentencing Hamling in absentia, the prosecution
bears the burden of making a preliminary showing,
based on reasonable inquiry, that defendant's absence
is voluntary. State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, K 22,
428 Utah Adv. Rep. 10. Only after inquiry, the court,
in appropriate circumstances, may infer that the
defendant's absence is voluntary. Id. at \ 23. Defense
counsel must "then have the opportunity to rebut the
inference of voluntariness." Id. at \ 24. The court did
not require any evidence from the State and inferred
Hamling was voluntarily absent based solely on the fact
that the defendant was not present and none of the
parties had contact with him within two weeks prior to
sentencing.
When neither the court nor counsel have information
as to why the defendant is absent, the court should
grant a continuance to allow reasonable inquiry into his
nonappearance. Id. at f 22. This court, in Wanosik, set
forth some factors the court may consider in
determining whether an absence is voluntary. Id. at f
23.
Upon remand, sentencing must be in accordance with
the procedure set forth in Wanosik. Id. at f 38. Such
procedure includes giving both the defense and the
prosecution the opportunity to make a statement prior
to sentencing
Lastly, the State argues that post-sentencing trial court
docket entries, made after the defendant was
subsequently arrested, reflect no good reason why the
defendant failed to appear at his sentencing. These later
developments have no bearing on whether the
defendant was sentenced lawfully as post-sentencing
information was not considered in the court's
determination of voluntariness.
*2 We vacate Hamling's sentence and remand for
resentencing in accordance with State v. Wanosik.
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